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Vanuatu is not reviewed in this issue. 
Bougainville
In 2017, the Autonomous Region of 
Bougainville in Papua New Guinea 
(PNG) entered its final and decisive 
stage of peacebuilding, with prepara-
tions for a referendum on the future 
political status of the region com-
mencing in earnest. Peacebuilding on 
Bougainville began in the late 1990s 
after a decade-long violent conflict. 
During the conflict, Bougainvilleans 
suffered from the collapse of basic 
services such as health and education 
and the breakdown of infrastructure 
and public administration. Out of the 
almost 20,000 Bougainvilleans who 
lost their lives, only a minority were 
combatants killed in action; the vast 
majority were civilians. Fighting also 
led to the displacement of more than 
40 percent of Bougainville’s popula-
tion of approximately 250,000 people. 
The root causes of the war were 
the negative social and environmen-
tal effects of a giant mining project, 
the Panguna gold and copper mine, 
which had been established in Cen-
tral Bougainville in 1972. In the late 
1980s, locals in the mine area started 
to demand meaningful environmental 
protection measures, compensation for 
environmental damage, and a larger 
share of the revenues generated. The 
multinational mining company that 
operated the mine (known today as 
Rio Tinto) and the government of 
Papua New Guinea (GoPNG), both of 
which profited enormously from Pan-
guna, disregarded the locals’ concerns. 
As a consequence, disgruntled young 
Bougainvilleans brought the mine to a 
standstill through acts of sabotage in 
late 1988. The GoPNG sent its police 
riot squads and later its military to the 
island and declared a state of emer-
gency on Bougainville in June 1989. 
Opponents of the mine established 
the Bougainville Revolutionary Army 
(bra), which took up the fight against 
the PNG security forces. Fighting that 
started in central Bougainville soon 
spread across the whole island. The 
bra adopted a secessionist stance and 
called for political independence for 
Bougainville. bra fighters managed 
to overrun and shut down the mine 
at an early stage of the war, and it has 
remained closed ever since. 
In its war against the bra, the 
PNG military was supported by local 
Bougainvillean auxiliary units, the 
so-called Resistance Forces. Over time, 
it became the Resistance that bore the 
brunt of the fighting for the govern-
ment side. Moreover, long-standing 
local conflicts were also carried out 
violently under the umbrella of the 
war of secession. Parties entangled in 
local conflicts either joined the bra or 
the Resistance, the war became more 
and more complex, and the frontiers 
blurred. The time of war was to a 
large extent a time of statelessness. 
The institutions of the PNG state were 
forced to withdraw from Bougainville, 
and the secessionists were unable to 
build their own state institutions. This 
opened the space for the resurgence of 
non-state, local customary governance 
institutions so that traditional authori-
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ties, such as elders and chiefs, became 
responsible for organizing commu-
nity life. They drew on long-standing 
customary norms when dealing with 
conflicts in the local context, often 
facilitating reconciliations at the intra- 
and inter-community levels.
Thus, local peacebuilding had 
already generated positive results well 
before a high-level political peace pro-
cess commenced in 1997. A formal, 
Bougainville-wide ceasefire came into 
effect at the end of April 1998, paving 
the way for official peace negotia-
tions, which finally culminated in the 
Bougainville Peace Agreement (bpa) 
on 30 August 2001. The bpa has two 
core political provisions: first, the 
establishment of the Autonomous 
Region of Bougainville (ARoB) as a 
special political entity within the PNG 
state, with far-reaching autonomy; and 
second, a referendum on the future 
political status of Bougainville—either 
complete independence or remaining 
with Papua New Guinea. The bpa 
stipulates that the referendum has 
to be held ten to fifteen years after 
the establishment of an autonomous 
government for Bougainville (which 
took place in 2005). The ARoB has 
its own constitution, adopted by the 
Bougainville Constituent Assembly on 
12 November 2004. The first elections 
for a Bougainville House of Repre-
sentatives and a president were held 
in June 2005, followed by two more 
elections in 2010 and 2015. At pres-
ent, Bougainvilleans are governed by 
their own Autonomous Bougainville 
Government (abg).
In May 2016, the abg and the 
GoPNG agreed on the target date 
of 15 June 2019 for the referen-
dum on the future political status of 
 Bougainville. It can be argued that 
only with the referendum and the 
peaceful implementation of its provi-
sions will peacebuilding have reached 
a satisfactory conclusion. (For an over-
view of the war and of post- conflict 
peacebuilding, see Wallis 2014; Regan 
2010; Braithwaite and others, 2010; 
Carl and Garasu 2002; for the histori-
cal, social, and political context, see 
Regan and Griffin 2005.)
While Bougainville peace is mainly 
homegrown, an international peace-
building intervention—which, com-
pared to other endeavors, was a “light 
intervention” (Regan 2010)—has 
also played an important role. New 
Zealand hosted the initial rounds of 
peace talks and negotiations. Neigh-
boring states and the United Nations 
conducted, with the consent of the 
conflict parties, a peacebuilding 
intervention. The United Nations sent 
a small observer mission from August 
1998 to the end of 2003. Furthermore, 
a regional Truce Monitoring Group, 
which later became the Peace Moni-
toring Group, was on the island from 
late 1997 to June 2003. New Zealand 
led the Truce Monitoring Group and 
Australia led the Peace Monitor-
ing Group, with Australia providing 
the bulk of personnel and resources 
(Wehner and Denoon 2001; Adams 
2001; Bowd 2007; Braithwaite and 
others 2010; Regan 2010; Breen 2016; 
Boege, Debiel, and Rinck 2017). 
In general, Bougainville is seen as 
a peacebuilding success story. This 
success is built on the constructive 
interactions between international 
and national state actors and institu-
tions on the one hand (in particular 
the GoPNG and the abg) and local 
customary actors and institutions on 
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the other. While the former pursue a 
Western, liberal agenda of peacebuild-
ing and state building, the latter work 
to introduce their custom-based ways 
of conflict transformation and forming 
political community into the process. 
In the course of this local/custom-
ary–international/liberal interface, 
hybrid forms of peace and governance 
are emerging that differ considerably 
from Western, liberal concepts (Boege 
2010, 2011).
Despite the overall success of 
peacebuilding and state forma-
tion on Bougainville, some areas 
of Bougainville are still controlled 
by armed groups that have not yet 
officially joined the peace process, 
and some sections of the population 
do not acknowledge the abg as the 
(only) rightful government. Mention 
has to be made in particular of the 
Meekamui movement (Meekamui 
means “holy land” in one of the local 
 Bougainville languages). Meekamui is 
the faction that split from the former 
bra when the peace process com-
menced in the late 1990s. Meekamui 
is in control of the area around the 
Panguna mine in central Bougain-
ville as well as pockets in the south 
of the island. The Panguna Meeka-
mui have their own government, the 
Meekamui Government of Unity 
(mgu), and their own  military, the 
Meekamui Defence Force. Although 
the Meekamuis have not yet officially 
joined the peace process, they have 
never undermined it either. Meekamui 
has declared the territory under its 
control around the Panguna mine a 
“no-go zone” for outsiders, although 
the “border” between the no-go zone 
and the rest of  Bougainville is rather 
porous. In August 2007, meetings 
between the abg and the mgu yielded 
the Panguna Communiqué, which 
laid the foundations for an ongoing 
process of  rapprochement between 
the two entities. Since then the abg 
and  Meekamui have been involved in 
various forms of exchange, with both 
sides committed to the “unification” 
of all  Bougainvilleans.
Although the Meekamuis insist that 
in principle Bougainville is already 
independent (the bra proclaimed a 
Unilateral Declaration of Indepen-
dence in May 1990), the Panguna 
Meekamuis have joined the process 
toward referendum. This includes 
a commitment to disarm before the 
end of 2018. The Meekamui move-
ment, however, is not a unitary force 
but consists of several factions. While 
the mgu is willing to come to the 
table, other factions are more reluc-
tant, namely a group led by Noah 
 Musingku, who proclaimed himself 
“king” (King David Peii II) and has 
established a “kingdom” around Tonu 
in southern Bougainville, and a group 
led by Damien Koike, a former bra 
commander who controls a no-go 
zone in Konnou, also in south Bou-
gainville, where he operates his own 
gold mine. Bringing these “wild cards” 
into the referendum process will be a 
challenge.
An important step in this regard 
was made in early May 2017 when 
leaders and (ex-) commanders of 
the bra, the Resistance, and various 
Meekamui factions came together for 
a four-day meeting in Arawa under the 
title “Re-Unifying Bougainville for a 
Free and Fair Referendum” (even the 
“king” sent the “general” of his “royal 
guard”), followed by a reconciliation 
ceremony on 17 May. Since the split in 
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1997, these leaders had been divided 
between the majority of the bra, 
which joined the peace process, and 
the minority faction, which became 
the Meekamuis. Each group has pur-
sued their own political agendas (and 
economic projects), often competing 
with and rarely talking to one another. 
This meeting was thus hailed as a 
great success as it committed all sides 
to working together in the referendum 
process and the associated process of 
weapons disposal (Memorandum of 
Joint Commitment 2017). Later in the 
year, in September, veterans from all 
sides and from all over Bougainville 
reaffirmed their determination to work 
hard for weapons disposal, with the 
aim of declaring Bougainville weapons 
free no later than 31 December 2018 
(The Bougainville Bulletin 2017). It 
remains to be seen whether all sides 
will stand by their commitments.
Referendum preparations gained 
considerable momentum in 2017. 
They started immediately after the 
Joint Supervisory Body (jsb)—the 
joint GoPNG–abg institution that is 
in charge of the implementation of 
the bpa—agreed at its 20 May 2016 
meeting to set 15 June 2019 as the 
target date for the referendum. On 
the abg side, it is the Department of 
Bougainville Peace Agreement Imple-
mentation (dpai) (which until March 
2017 was the Department of Refer-
endum, Veterans’ Affairs and Peace) 
under its Secretary James Tanis that is 
in charge of the referendum process. 
Its counterpart on the GoPNG side is 
the National Coordination Office of 
Bougainville Affairs. Both institutions 
have worked together to establish the 
organizational structure for the prepa-
ration and conduct of the referendum, 
setting up various committees such 
as the Joint Bougainville Referendum 
Committee and the Joint Bougain-
ville Referendum Communications 
 Committee.
Most important, agreement on the 
features of the independent adminis-
trative agency that, according to the 
bpa, has to conduct the referendum, 
were reached in January 2017: It was 
decided that a Bougainville Referen-
dum Commission (brc) should be 
formed. After lengthy preparations, 
the charter for the brc was finally 
signed on 30 August 2017 by Papua 
New Guinea’s governor-general. The 
brc has as its governing body a seven-
person Board of Commissioners, com-
prising the National and Bougainville 
Electoral Commissioners, two persons 
appointed by the GoPNG and two by 
the abg, and a chairperson appointed 
by the jsb (with the understanding 
that this chairperson should be an 
eminent international elder statesman/
woman). The board will be supported 
by a brc Secretariat under a chief ref-
erendum officer. Until the brc is fully 
established, a transitional committee, 
comprising the electoral commission-
ers and chief secretaries of both sides, 
is in charge (Bougainville Referendum 
Commission Charter 2017).
After several postponements, a 
crucial meeting of the jsb finally 
took place on 14 and 15 December 
2017 in Port Moresby. Its focus was 
on referendum preparations. At that 
time, the sides agreed on the abg’s 
suggestion for a brc chairperson: 
former New Zealand Prime Minister 
Helen Clark. They also endorsed the 
abg-appointed brc members: former 
abg Vice President Patrick Nisira and 
Hillary Masiria (the PNG government 
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still has to appoint its two brc mem-
bers). They also decided to establish a 
trust account for the brc and agreed 
to invite international observers “to 
observe the conduct of every phase of 
the Referendum process” (jsb 2017, 
4). With regard to the eligibility of 
Bougainvilleans living outside of the 
ARoB to participate in the referen-
dum, the “need for development of a 
process to enable non-resident Bou-
gainvilleans to enroll and vote in the 
referendum” was acknowledged (jsb 
2017, 3), and technical officials were 
given the task of working on the issue. 
Regarding the referendum question, 
the sides merely “noted” the “Bou-
gainville aspiration to have a simple 
yes or no question to the question of 
separate independence for Bougain-
ville” (jsb 2017, 3), but no decision 
was made. Finally, the jsb endorsed 
the “need to conduct National Recon-
ciliation between  Bougainvilleans and 
PNG security forces and other parties 
that were involved in the Bougainville 
conflict” (jsb 2017, 7)—which could 
include Solomon Islands and Austra-
lia.
The December jsb meeting demon-
strated once more that the abg side 
is well ahead in referendum prepara-
tions, while the GoPNG is lagging 
behind and is more hesitant. More-
over, in September 2017, Prime Min-
ister Peter O’Neill even cast doubts 
on the overall process, telling the 
PNG Parliament that it may be that 
the referendum will not be possible 
because certain criteria, such as rule 
of law, good governance, or weapons 
disposal, have not been met (Bougain-
ville News 2017). In response, the abg 
President John Momis called O’Neill’s 
statement “dangerous” and reassured 
his fellow Bougainvilleans that the 
referendum would go ahead, clarify-
ing (again) that, according to the bpa, 
weapons disposal and good gover-
nance are not preconditions for the 
conduct of the referendum (Bougain-
ville News 2017). In fact, the bpa—
and also the PNG Constitution—
clearly stipulate that a referendum has 
to take place before June 2020, no 
matter what. It is to be expected that 
the abg–GoPNG dialogue on referen-
dum will remain difficult in the future.
At least as important as the collabo-
ration between the two governments 
is the work at the grassroots level in 
Bougainville to raise awareness of 
the referendum process. In September 
2016, the abg agreed on a “Bougain-
ville Referendum Ready Concept,” 
which tasked each of the thirty-three 
constituencies in Bougainville to 
prepare for the referendum. Constitu-
ency referendum committees were 
established in every constituency; they 
carry out referendum awareness at the 
local level, with the aim of making 
each and every hamlet, village, ward, 
and constituency “referendum ready.” 
The first constituency that declared 
itself referendum ready was Bolave in 
Southern Bougainville on 7 September 
2017; it was followed by Hagogohe 
constituency in North Bougainville on 
29 October 2017 (The Bougainville 
Bulletin 2017, 6). Others are to follow 
in 2018, with 31 December 2018 as 
the target date set by the Bougainville 
House of Representatives for refer-
endum readiness. Furthermore, local 
facilitators and nongovernmental 
organizations conduct local referen-
dum dialogues in cooperation with 
the dpai. Despite these efforts, there 
are still many Bougainvilleans who 
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say that they need more information 
and clarity on referendum issues, 
indicating that work at the local 
level will have to intensify further in 
2018. Accordingly, all members of the 
Bougainville House of Representatives 
have been allocated funds for aware-
ness-raising activities in their constitu-
encies in 2018. 
The referendum process enjoyed 
some international assistance in 
2017. The United Nations provides 
support through its Peacebuilding 
Fund and the Bougainville office of 
the UN Development Programme. 
The international nongovernmental 
organizations Conciliation Resources 
(London) and Peace and Conflict 
Studies Institute Australia (Brisbane) 
cooperate with the dpai and local 
nongovernmental organizations in 
referendum preparation, organizing 
referendum dialogues all over Bou-
gainville (through the Bougainville 
Referendum Dialogues project) and 
exchanges with international actors 
who provide information about their 
experiences, for example, from South 
Sudan or Northern Ireland (through 
the Comparative Learning program). 
There are still challenges ahead for 
the referendum, not least the establish-
ment of a reliable, up-to-date common 
roll. The elections for the PNG Parlia-
ment in 2017 demonstrated that the 
current electoral roll is totally unreli-
able (even the names of abg President 
Momis and his wife were missing; they 
had to use the supplementary roll). 
As this shows, much work has to be 
done on voter registration. Only if it 
is guaranteed that every eligible voter 
can participate in the referendum will 
the outcome be accepted as valid and 
legitimate. In this context, eligibility of 
nonresident Bougainvilleans (living in 
other parts of Papua New Guinea or 
overseas) needs further clarification. 
Finally, weapons disposal remains an 
issue so as to provide for a free and 
safe referendum. A four-stage  weapons 
disposal plan endorsed by the jsb in 
December 2017 has to be  implemented 
in 2018. 
The second major political topic on 
Bougainville in 2017 was the Pan-
guna mine. In June 2016, Rio Tinto, 
the multinational mining company 
that was the majority shareholder of 
Bougainville Copper Limited (bcl), 
which for almost two decades had 
operated the Panguna mine until its 
closure at the beginning of the war, 
completely withdrew from Panguna. 
It transferred its shares to the GoPNG 
and the abg—at no cost. The two 
governments became equal major-
ity shareholders, each holding 36.45 
percent of bcl. At the same time, Rio 
Tinto made it clear that it does not see 
any obligation to address the mine’s 
environmental and social legacies, 
arguing that it adhered to Papua New 
Guinea’s laws of the day. It rejects any 
responsibility for the environmental, 
social, health, and other long-term 
impacts of Panguna mine operations. 
The abg strongly criticized Rio 
Tinto’s stance regarding Panguna’s 
legacy issue and also demanded that 
the GoPNG transfer its bcl shares to 
the abg as the representative of the 
people of Bougainville and the right-
ful owners of Bougainville’s mineral 
resources. However, the abg also 
made it clear that it supported reopen-
ing the Panguna mine with the “new” 
(non–Rio Tinto) bcl as operator, 
as it sees mining as the best way to 
substantially increase government 
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revenue and foster economic growth 
and development for an autono-
mous—and, further down the road, 
an independent—Bougainville. An 
independent Bougainville, so the argu-
ment goes, can only survive in a glo-
balized economy if it generates value 
from its mineral wealth. At the same 
time, however, the abg  emphasized 
that it will not allow reopening of the 
Panguna mine or any other large-scale 
mining on Bougainville without the 
consent of landowners. In fact, the 
Bougainville Mining Act of March 
2015 puts the landowners front and 
center: It declares that the custom-
ary landowners are the owners of the 
minerals on and beneath their land, 
giving them strong veto rights over 
exploration and mining development 
tenements.
bcl has always said that it wants 
to reopen the mine and run it again, 
continuously talking about the “new 
Panguna” it will create as a way to 
distance itself from the “old Panguna” 
and the “mistakes” it made in the 
past. bcl management presented a 
staged redevelopment plan to share-
holders, landowner associations, and 
the abg at the beginning of 2017, 
and it has advertised this plan at 
several other occasions throughout 
2017. bcl posited that redevelopment 
could be done within six to seven 
years, and to this end it intensified 
its presence on the ground: In August 
2017 it held its first board meeting 
in Bougainville in more than twenty-
seven years, and in the same month 
a permanent office was established 
in Buka, the ARoB’s administrative 
center, with local  Bougainville staff. 
bcl had major players on its side: the 
abg, the GoPNG, and all but one of 
the nine landowner associations in the 
mine-affected areas. Again and again, 
bcl claimed that it had “strong levels 
of support among landowners for 
mine redevelopment with bcl as the 
preferred developer” (bcl 2017). The 
fact, however, is that there also exists 
a strong anti-bcl camp.
This became obvious in June 2017 
when a delegation of bcl and abg 
tried to travel to Panguna to sign a 
memorandum of understanding with 
landowner associations on reopening 
the mine. The delegation was forced 
to turn around at Morgan Junction, 
at the entrance of the access road to 
the mine, controlled by a  Meekamui 
roadblock, because it was met by big 
 demonstrations led by local women 
under banners reading “No to min-
ing” and “No to bcl” (Papua New 
Guinea Mine Watch 2017). As has 
been said before, the Panguna mine 
site and its surroundings are con-
trolled by the Meekamuis, and they 
are opposed to the return of bcl. 
Opposed also is the association 
representing the landowners from the 
Special Mining Lease area (smlola), 
which distinguishes it from the other 
landowner associations from other 
mine-affected areas that are in the 
pro-bcl camp. In fact, the smlola 
chairman is also the mgu premier 
(Philip Miriori). mgu and smlola, 
however, are not anti-mining per se, 
but only anti-bcl. They agree with 
the abg’s view that the Panguna mine 
is necessary for economic develop-
ment of Bougainville but want to do 
mining without bcl. Actually, they 
have aligned themselves with a junior 
Australian mining company, rtg 
Mining Inc, and want to redevelop the 
Panguna mine in a joint venture with 
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rtg. Thus, 2017 also saw a continu-
ous struggle between the pro-bcl and 
the pro-rtg forces.
Last but not least, there are also 
those locals who are opposed to any 
reopening of the Panguna mine at 
this point in time. This anti-mining 
camp comprises several community-
based organizations and networks, 
most notably women’s organizations 
and groupings of ex-bra combatants. 
Some in this camp are totally anti-
mining, while others hold the view 
that the referendum and independence 
must occur before discussions about 
mining can resume under new political 
conditions.
The conflict between the differ-
ent camps reached a climax on 11 
December 2017 when a mine warden’s 
hearing took place in Panguna, dealing 
with bcl’s application for renewal 
of its Panguna exploration license. 
Such hearings are legally required in 
order to assess whether the applica-
tion has the necessary support of the 
land owners in the license area. Based 
on the assessment, the warden makes 
 recommendations, which then form 
the basis for a final decision to be 
made by the abg’s Executive Council. 
In preparation for the mine 
 warden’s hearing of 11 December 
2017, all sides mobilized their forces. 
More than one hundred written 
objections were lodged with the war-
den,  including those from smlola, 
women’s groups, and anti-mining 
networks. An anti-bcl petition (“No 
to bcl Forever”) launched by smlola 
was signed by more than two thou-
sand members. The hearing was 
dominated by anti-bcl sentiments. 
For bcl, its outcome was a major set-
back as it became obvious how strong 
the opposition to its return to  Panguna 
is. smlola clearly conveyed the 
 message that it is not willing to grant 
bcl access to the mine site (Radio 
New Zealand 2018a).
Following the hearing, abg Presi-
dent John Momis announced on 20 
December 2017 that the Bougainville 
Executive Council “made a thought-
ful and considered decision to impose 
an indefinite reservation moratorium 
from any exploration or mining over 
Panguna project in the best interest 
of the landowners and the people of 
Bougainville” (Laukai 2017). The 
lack of landowner consent was given 
as the reason for this decision. At the 
same time, Momis declared the devel-
opment of the mine “by any other 
 developer” to be “untenable under 
current circumstances”—which was a 
clear rebuke of rtg—while also prom-
ising to “continue to consult with the 
Panguna Landowners and the people 
of Bougainville on an appro priate 
arrangement . . . if the people still have 
an appetite to develop the mine in the 
future” (Laukai 2017). Shortly after-
ward, Momis even said that “we can’t 
allow bcl’s  involvement in  Panguna 
that may lead to  bloodshed. . . . We 
can’t open the mine in the face of 
such huge  opposition from the people. 
According to our law, the landowners 
own the resource, not the government. 
Until companies win the social license 
from the landowners they are barking 
up the wrong tree” (Radio New Zea-
land 2018b). These statements indicate 
that the abg has given up on Panguna/
bcl for the time being. It remains to 
be seen whether the rift between the 
abg and bcl can be mended in 2018, 
as well as whether smlola/rtg, who 
of course  welcomed the abg’s rejec-
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tion of bcl, can profit from the new 
situation. 
While putting Panguna on hold, the 
abg still maintains its preference for 
mining as the most promising path for 
economic development. Accordingly, 
it approved three new mining explora-
tion licenses on 17 November 2017: 
two for areas in north  Bougainville, 
and one for an area in the border 
region of Central and South Bou-
gainville. The first two are for the 
joint venture companies Toremana 
Resources Limited and (Australian) 
Kalia Investment Limited, covering the 
Tore area in Tinputz district. The third 
mining license went to Isina Resources 
Holdings Limited in the Kongara/
Koromira region. Isina is a company 
led by the former bra supreme mili-
tary commander Sam Kauona.
The pros and cons of mining will 
remain an issue on Bougainville. 
Critics of the narrow focus on min-
ing point to other areas with potential 
for economic development: fisher-
ies, (eco-)tourism, and agriculture, 
in  particular copra and cocoa. 
The Second Bougainville Chocolate 
Festival, which was held in September 
2017 in Arawa and which brought 
together local cocoa farmers with 
chocolate makers and buyers from 
overseas, demonstrated the potential 
of the cocoa sector.
Bougainville is indeed in dire need 
of its own sources of revenue to 
overcome its financial dependency on 
Papua New Guinea. The long-standing 
conflict between the GoPNG and 
the abg regarding abg’s financing 
was partly resolved at the jsb meet-
ing in December 2017 when the sides 
reached a compromise that grants the 
abg k437 million (us$135.9 mil-
lion) as Restoration and Development 
Grant for 2018. Over the last few 
years, the abg constantly complained 
that it did not receive the funds from 
the GoPNG that it is entitled to 
according to the bpa. In the past, only 
portions of the designated funds were 
transferred, often with long delays, 
and this had considerable negative 
impacts on the functioning of the 
autonomy arrangements. 
Bougainvilleans went to the polls 
twice in 2017. In April 2017, the first 
community government elections were 
held, according to the Bougainville 
Community Government Act of 2016. 
In 425 wards, members for forty-three 
rural community governments were 
elected (elections for the four urban 
governments are to follow). These 
community governments replace the 
councils of elders as the local level of 
government in Bougainville. 
Bougainville also participated in the 
national PNG elections in June–July 
2017. ARoB has four representatives 
in the PNG national Parliament—
one each for the regions of North, 
Central, and South, and one for the 
entirety of ARoB. Two incumbents 
were reelected: Joe Lera for ARoB and 
Timothy Masiu for South. For North, 
 William Nakin was newly elected, 
and for Central, Simon Dumarinu, 
who was then appointed Bougainville 
affairs minister in the O’Neill govern-
ment. After being elected, all four 
members made a joint pledge to work 
closely together with the Bougain-
ville House of Representatives for the 
implementation of the bpa and the 
referendum. 
The elections and the issues of 
 referendum and the Panguna mine 
overshadowed other important 
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 problems throughout 2017. For exam-
ple, the negative impacts of climate 
change, which due to sea-level rise 
can be felt directly by the people on 
the low-lying atolls in the ARoB, only 
received little attention. The plight of 
the Carteret Islanders, who are being 
forced to relocate from their atoll to 
mainland Bougainville, seems to be 
better known and of more concern at 
the world stage than in Bougainville 
itself. Over the last few years, the 
local nongovernmental organization 
Tulele Peisa has been very successful in 
drawing international attention to the 
fate of the “climate refugees” from the 
Carterets. But this has not yet trans-
lated into sufficient effective measures 
on the ground. Climate change and 
ensuing need for adaptation and reset-
tlement remain a pressing problem for 
the outer islands in the ARoB. 
Other issues that did not get the 
attention they deserve in 2017 include 
the high levels of youth unemployment 
and of domestic and gender-based 
violence as well as the massive rise 
in sorcery accusations and sorcery-
related violence.
volker boege
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Fiji
Contemporary political events and 
issues in Fiji, especially in the period 
between 1987 and 2017, can be 
understood most fully by analyzing the 
dynamics of ongoing power rivalry in 
Fiji. Within this thirty-year period, Fiji 
has had three military and one civil-
ian/military coups d’état, highlighting 
modern and customary struggles for 
national leadership. While military 
and national leadership has remained 
in the hands of Indigenous Fijian 
males since 1987, and coup leaders–
turned–national leaders have also been 
Indigenous Fijian males, the reasons 
for staging coups and for supporting 
coups have shifted over time. In 1987, 
Sitiveni Rabuka staged two military 
coups to return political leadership 
to Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara’s Alliance 
Party. In 2000, George Speight staged 
a failed coup. However, the ruling 
Fiji Labour Party Coalition was not 
returned to power. Frank Bainima-
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rama’s military coup d’état in 2006 
was dubbed as a “cleanup campaign” 
to rid Fiji of a variety of ills such as 
corruption and nepotism. Bainima-
rama’s leadership is ongoing, albeit 
with a number of issues voiced by his 
opponents.
Fiji’s political evolution through 
all the coup periods has reflected 
the nature of power rivalry among 
 different elite groups, wherein class 
and ethnicity merged and also con-
flicted, raising other problems. 
National leadership through the mili-
tarization of the state saw the enforce-
ment of democracy through the barrel 
of a gun. Military dictatorships after 
coups created their own sociopolitical 
and economic relations, conducive to 
strengthening their grapples for power. 
Fiji’s political economy between 1987 
and 2017 has been driven by these 
national power contests. These three 
decades have seen the emergence of 
politically ambitious military coup 
leaders, at times supporting the inter-
ests of some Indigenous leaders and 
the business class and at times clashing 
with these interests. Against this his-
torical background, this review high-
lights unfolding and ongoing political 
issues and events in Fiji in 2017. 
Fiji’s population in the 2017 census 
was 884,887, reflecting a gradual 
increase of 47,660 after the 2007 
census. The Fijian male population 
overall was 50.7 percent, surpassing 
that of the female population at 49.3 
percent. Approximately 70 percent of 
Fiji’s population is below the age of 40 
(Fiji One News, 13 Jan 2018).
The urban population increased to 
494,252 or 65.9 percent of the overall 
population. This was an increase of 
10 percent over the last census, when 
the urban population was 55.9 percent 
of the total. Fiji’s Bureau of Statistics 
explained the slow increase in the 
overall population as due to factors 
including high outward migration 
and a decrease in fertility levels. The 
increase in the urban population may 
be due also to a number of factors, 
for instance, the extension of town 
boundaries and the rural-to-urban 
drift due to the availability of schools, 
health-care facilities, and employment 
in the urban areas (Fiji One News, 
13 Jan 2018). An unstated but real 
factor that causes rural-to-urban drift 
in less-industrialized countries like 
Fiji is the lack of development in the 
rural and remote areas or in isolated 
islands.
As a consequence of urban 
migration, the populations of some 
 provinces in Fiji were on the decline 
in 2017. This included the two 
eastern maritime provinces of Lau 
and Lomaiviti as well as Macuata 
on Vanua Levu, Fiji’s second-largest 
island. A decline in rural population 
may also be attributed to a lack of 
infrastructure development in the rural 
areas, especially in the maritime prov-
inces, where shipping has always been 
irregular. As a result, the main island 
of Viti Levu, where most towns are 
located and where most development 
occurs, has approximately 600,000 
inhabitants or 70 percent of the over-
all population. Another key factor that 
contributed to the decrease in popula-
tion in provinces like Macuata was the 
nonrenewal of sugarcane leases from 
1990 onward (Lal, Lim-Applegate, 
and Reddy 2001).
The nonrenewal of leases caused 
Indo-Fijian farmers either to migrate 
to Viti Levu or to leave Fiji and 
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migrate overseas. The land issue has 
been a long-standing one in Fiji ever 
since the British colonial government 
prevented the alienation of native 
lands. Indigenous Fijians still own 
approximately 83 percent of land in 
the country and, since the coups in 
1987, fear of losing land and resources 
has been a main tenet that unites 
Indigenous Fijians under some of their 
mainstream political parties.
It is clear that one of the major 
 factors enabling the survival of mili-
tary dictatorships in Fiji is the creation 
of laws and decrees that protect the 
interests of such regimes. For example, 
one of the provisions in Rabuka’s 
1990 constitution protected his coup 
perpetrators; this was finally repealed 
in 1997 after the stabilization of his 
rule. After the fourth military coup in 
2006, Bainimarama’s military govern-
ment repealed the 1997 constitution 
after the Appeals Court in Fiji ruled 
on 10 April 2009 that the Bainima-
rama coup was illegal (Jowitt 2009). 
In 2013, the Bainimarama government 
promulgated yet another new constitu-
tion. In addition to the constitutional 
provision that protected the 2006 
coup perpetrators, critics have pointed 
to other decrees that are contradictory 
to democracy in Fiji. 
Fiji’s Media Industry and Devel-
opment Decree of 2010 is one such 
instance; it was still in existence in 
January 2017 and since its promulga-
tion, it has been consistent in silenc-
ing critics of the current government. 
This decree has seen the removal of 
senior officers from their positions 
in both the public and private sec-
tors. For example, in January 2017, 
Geoffrey Smith, the chief executive 
officer of Fiji Television, was forced 
to resign from his job. He followed 
in the footsteps of other colleagues in 
the same company: his predecessor 
Tevita Gonelevu and, earlier, Fiji tv’s 
investment specialist, Mesake Nawari. 
Basically, Fiji tv, under the leadership 
of these people and others who were 
also sidelined or sacked, refused to 
adhere to the requirements of the Fiji 
First government’s media decree (ib, 
Jan 2017, 8–10). (The Fiji First politi-
cal party was formed by Bainimarama 
in 2014.)
Censorship of news is one of the 
major tactics still used by the Bainima-
rama government to keep Fiji’s people 
ignorant about crucial happenings in 
Fiji. In early 2016, Professor Biman 
Prasad, leader of the National Federa-
tion Party (nfp), spoke to this ongoing 
issue: “Media organisations operate 
under the threat of their editors being 
hauled before the Media Tribunal 
and subjected to huge fines and other 
punishments. The lack of access to a 
free and independent media has been 
the single most frustrating obstacle 
for the opposition parties when they 
try to make the Government pub-
licly accountable on various national 
issues” (Prasad 2016).
Critiquing the newly introduced 
laws or amendments to laws by the 
current government in Fiji has also 
resulted in drastic measures, including 
deportation. In December 2016, Karen 
Seaton, a foreigner (US/Canadian) and 
freehold landowner on an island in 
Fiji, was deported after she appeared 
before a parliamentary committee 
to lobby for support against Fiji’s 
amendment to a land sales regulation 
(ib, Jan 2017, 16). Section 7 of the 
amendment stated: “Current non-
resident owners of vacant lots within 
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or outside of town/city boundaries 
are required to complete construction 
of a new residential dwelling, with a 
minimum expenditure of f$250,000, 
by 31 December 2016” (Munro Ley’s 
Law 2014). The complaint by Seaton 
and members of the Fiji Landowners 
Association was based on the fact that 
they were already landowners before 
the amendment was first introduced 
in 2014. They argued that the amend-
ment was wrong in principle as it 
treated everyone alike, making no pro-
visions for old owners (ib, Jan 2017, 
16). There was no avenue to recon-
sider the Fiji Landowner’s Association 
complaint. 
The Media Industry and Develop-
ment Decree has also been successful 
in keeping Fijians ignorant about the 
extent of China’s influence in Fiji. For 
example, Chinese police arrived in 
Fiji in 2017 to remove seventy-seven 
 Chinese citizens who were alleged to 
have committed cyber-crime and credit 
card fraud in Fiji. Except for a brief 
commentary in Islands Business, this 
news was not covered by other media 
companies in Fiji (ib, Sept 2017, 6). 
The main issue here is that the Chinese 
criminals were never charged in any 
court in Fiji, defying Fiji’s sovereignty 
as an independent state with its own 
judiciary system. 
China has been a willing aid donor 
to Fiji’s military governments ever 
since Rabuka’s coup in 1987, and 
Chinese aid to Fiji intensified after 
Bainimarama’s 2006 military coup. 
Fiji’s need for Chinese aid intensified 
as China, unlike Fiji’s Western allies, 
did not demand adherence to demo-
cratic principles as a prerequisite to 
aid delivery. Aid to small islands and 
military dictatorships like Fiji becomes 
problematic when it is used to per-
petuate the rule of governments that 
violate and suppress human rights. 
Fiji’s civil servants feel very insecure 
under the current government since 
the February 2016 introduction of the 
Open Merit Recruitment and Selection 
(omrs) guidelines, whereby a civil 
servant can be immediately termi-
nated if “they are not doing well.” 
Minister for Economy and Attorney-
General Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum argued 
in September 2017 that when civil 
servants are removed from their jobs, 
they should know they are not doing 
their jobs well (Nasiko 2017). Civil 
servants can no longer appeal to have 
their cases heard, as was previously 
practiced in Fiji’s Public Service Com-
mission (psc). In 2016, nfp’s Biman 
Prasad predicted that the reform of 
Fiji’s civil service by removing the 
psc and creating a Ministry of Civil 
Service would be disastrous in the long 
term (Prasad 2016).
Additionally, senior government 
positions such as those of ministe-
rial permanent secretaries have been 
opened up to foreign nationals. This 
issue was raised by Fiji’s former Per-
manent Secretary for Foreign Affairs 
and also former Ambassador to the 
United Arab Emirates Robyn Nair in 
2017. Nair argued that the opening 
up of the permanent secretary posts 
to foreign nationals did not look good 
for Fiji in a number of ways. First, it 
may imply that, after so many decades 
of independence (since 1970), Fiji still 
could not produce a caliber of local 
senior civil servants to be permanent 
secretaries in government ministries. 
Second, the government of the day 
through its ministers interfered a lot 
in the hiring and firing of permanent 
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secretaries. Third, hiring foreign 
nationals made Fiji civil servants feel 
insecure regarding their career path 
in their own government and coun-
try (Nair 2017). Perhaps another 
 crucial question that should be posed 
is whether other democracies around 
the world allow noncitizens to work 
in senior civil service positions where 
they are privy to classified government 
information. 
In my 2017 research on “Untold 
Stories of Fiji’s 2006 Coup Victims,” 
I interviewed a former senior Fijian 
civil servant and information technol-
ogy (it) professional who now lives 
abroad (interview, 25 Oct 2017). He 
was removed from his position as head 
of the Fiji Government it systems and 
it networks, in which he was tasked 
with looking after the following: sys-
tems for government payroll; financial 
management information; the Fiji land 
information; births, deaths, and mar-
riages; immigration; e-government; the 
bureau of statistics, and the govern-
ment it network including satellite 
stations and election systems. These 
responsibilities were transferred to 
an it company based in India, which 
operates in conjunction with a Fiji-
based company called Pacific Tech-
nologies. Again, the crucial question 
that is asked here is not only whether 
government’s classified information is 
still safe but also how and why inter-
national companies are able to move 
in to take over jobs from qualified 
locals, even in the civil service.
Promises by politicians for a  better 
government to improve things for 
Fiji’s people intensified in 2017. 
Over time, the Bainimarama govern-
ment has become unpopular among 
a section of Indigenous Fijian voters. 
Social media carry a lot of Indigenous 
Fijian grievances against the Fiji First 
government (Fiji Exposed Forum 
2018; Fiji Native and Tribal Congress 
2018). Dissatisfaction in Indigenous 
Fijian leadership in Parliament has 
resulted in yet another search for an 
Indigenous leader to head the leading 
opposition party, the Social Demo-
cratic Liberal Party (sodelpa). 
Among a portion of Indigenous 
Fijian voters, there seems to be a 
genuine belief that a former military 
man and former coup leader can 
end the leadership of another former 
coup leader. In 2017, former military 
coup leader Sitiveni Rabuka took 
over sodelpa leadership from the 
current party leader, high chiefess 
Ro Teimumu Kepa, who is also the 
current opposition leader in the Fiji 
Parliament. Kepa announced she was 
not contesting the 2018 Fiji general 
elections (ib, Feb 2017, 8–10). From 
the time of Rabuka’s appointment in 
2017, there are currently two leaders 
for this party, Kepa as the sodelpa 
parliamentary leader and Rabuka, 
who is hoping to be elected to Parlia-
ment in the 2018 elections.
Rabuka, Fiji’s first coup leader, 
defeated two other candidates for the 
leadership of sodelpa in 2017. A 
unique characteristic of mainstream 
Indigenous Fijian political parties has 
been ongoing name changes. sodelpa 
evolved from the Soqosoqo Duavata ni 
Lewenivanua (sdl) Party, which had 
been ousted by the Bainimarama coup 
in 2006. Prior to the formation of 
the sdl party in 2001, Rabuka’s first 
party, the Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni 
Taukei (svt) party, had been formed in 
1991 to replace the Fijian Association 
arm of Ratu Mara’s Alliance Party 
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(Durutalo 2006, 296–297). While the 
name of the party changes in different 
election periods, the ideology of these 
mainstream Indigenous Fijian politi-
cal parties remains the same. One of 
the main philosophies of these parties 
has been the protection of Indigenous 
Fijian resources and rights.
Although Fiji now has only one 
constituency throughout the whole 
island group, Rabuka, in an effort 
to consolidate his power base for 
the 2018 elections, has been visit-
ing his old svt branches in his old 
constituency and home province of 
Cakaudrove (ib, Feb 2017, 8–9). 
Modern elections in Fiji and in other 
Pacific Island countries see politicians 
utilize their kinship and traditional 
cultural system to build power bases. 
Other Indigenous politicians have also 
used the same strategy by appealing to 
their kin in their provinces and vanua 
(traditional geopolitical boundary 
where a high chief rules). However, 
the campaign challenge in a one-con-
stituency electoral system is to defeat 
the dominant political party, which 
in Fiji’s case is Prime Minister Baini-
marama’s Fiji First Party, which did 
a lot of vote buying before the 2014 
elections (Durutalo 2016, 108–110). 
Although Bainimarama secured the 
highest number of votes (202,459) in 
the 2014 elections, only 84 percent of 
the registered 703,691 voters cast their 
votes. About 16 percent or 112,590 
voters did not vote. Rabuka is target-
ing those nonvoters in the 2018 Fiji 
general elections (ib, Feb 2017, 9). A 
test of popularity for Rabuka will be 
whether or not he secures a seat in 
Fiji’s Parliament in the 2018 elections.
One of the biggest challenges 
required in an effort to keep the Fiji 
economy afloat is for government to 
attract investors to engage in economi-
cally and environmentally sustainable 
investments in Fiji. Mining continued 
to attract foreign investment in Fiji 
in 2017, even though earlier  mining 
activities such as Chinese bauxite 
 mining in Nawailevu, Bua  Province, 
has not been environmentally friendly. 
In 2015, a high chief from the prov-
ince stated that the type of mining 
activity in Bua “should never be 
repeated in any other part of Fiji.” 
The chief, who was interviewed by 
Radio New Zealand, stated: “The 
villagers told me that they had agreed 
that the people mine bauxite but later 
they realised that they were cutting 
soil onto the boats that sailed to 
China. There was no machinery in 
Nawailevu to refine, to take away the 
bauxite from the soil so they took the 
whole soil, tonnes and tonnes” (Radio 
New Zealand 2015). The villagers 
near the  mining site also reported that 
fish turned a different color when min-
ing was  ongoing.
In March 2017, similar concerns 
were raised as Dome Gold Mines, an 
Australian mining company, started its 
first of three mining ventures in Fiji. 
The first venture, at the mouth of the 
Sigatoka river in southwest Viti Levu, 
involves the mining of the seabed to 
extract magnetized concentrate and 
iron ore. This Sigatoka riverbed min-
ing venture will then fund two other 
ventures. The second on Ono island 
in Kadavu is a gold-mining venture, 
and the third in the Nadrau plateau in 
central Viti Levu is a copper-mining 
venture (ib, March 2017, 8–10).
All three ventures are located in 
“ecologically sensitive and valuable 
eco-systems” (ib, March 2017, 9). For 
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example, in addition to the fact that 
many fishermen catch fish around the 
Sigatoka riverbed area and women 
collect freshwater mussels from 
the river, the mining venture is also 
located in the middle of Fiji’s largest 
tourism area, the Coral Coast. Dome’s 
Sigatoka riverbed venture is also 
located partially on the Sigatoka sand 
hills, a heritage site. The gold venture 
on Ono island in Kadavu is located 
on world-renowned Great Astrolabe 
Reef. This is a popular diving site 
for tourists from all over the world. 
The Nadrau plateau copper-mining 
venture is located near the Sovi Basin. 
This area is already tentatively listed 
under unesco (the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization) as a World Heritage site 
(ib, March 2017, 9). In the long term, 
Fiji’s attempt to be the Small Island 
Developing States (sids) champion 
in mitigating the impact of climate 
change is directly contradicted by the 
types of business ventures, like mining, 
that are ongoing in Fiji.
Climate change is a very complex 
issue as negotiations to mitigate its 
impacts transcend the sociopolitical 
and economic boundaries of all sover-
eign states, large and small. Addition-
ally, climate change mitigation “begins 
at home,” and sids like Fiji need to be 
conscious of man-made environmental 
degradation in their own backyards 
first and foremost before they ask the 
larger, more industrialized countries 
to cut down on carbon emissions. 
Fiji’s presidency of cop23 (the UN 
Climate Change conference) in Bonn, 
Germany, in November 2017 was met 
with multidimensional challenges for a 
small island state in the South Pacific.
At the international level, all 
industrialized countries normally 
take care of the sovereignty of their 
countries and their economic interests 
first and foremost. This was clearly 
demonstrated by the president of the 
United States when he withdrew from 
the Paris Agreement. At another level, 
sids in different regions also require 
the cooperation of their larger neigh-
bors. In the case of sids in the Pacific, 
the cooperation of their First World 
neighbors, Australia and New Zea-
land, are very much needed.
As explained by a Pacific negotia-
tor at the cop23 Bonn meeting, there 
were two parallel meetings that were 
disconnected. In the “Bula Zone,” the 
details of the Paris Agreement were 
negotiated. The “Bonn Zone” featured 
various side events or extracurricular 
events such as talks, cultural arti-
fact displays, Fijian singing, meke or 
 dancing, and kava drinking (ib, Dec 
2017, 4). Much of what appeared on 
the news and social media were the 
activities in the Bonn Zone, which 
were not directly connected to high-
powered climate change negotiations 
in the Bula Zone. In fact, the media 
spotlight on the Bonn Zone distracted 
attention from the purposes of the 
cop23 Bonn meeting.
cop23 failed to fulfill the wishes 
of the Small Islands Developing States 
in terms of what they had identified 
and agreed on at a Pacific Climate 
Champions meeting in Suva in July 
2017. For example, issues like loss 
and damage of islands and homes as 
well as the rise in ocean levels and 
the link between oceans and climate 
change had been discussed at length 
during that July meeting, but they 
were marginalized at the Bonn meet-
ing (cop23 2017). Furthermore, 
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consultants employed to advise the 
Fijian Presidency negotiating team 
lacked experience in climate change 
negotiation. Another observation was 
the fact that climate change confer-
ences and negotiations should be held 
in a small island developing state in 
the Pacific where participants would 
have a chance to observe firsthand the 
negative impacts of climate change 
through, for example, sea-level rise (ib, 
Dec 2017, 4).
Apart from the overwhelming 
impacts of climate change, Fiji, like 
other SidS, confronts its own socio-
political and economic realities on a 
daily basis. Industrial disputes were 
also part of Fiji’s journey in 2017. 
On Monday, 6 November 2017, 
the Fiji Times reported a statement by 
the general secretary of the Federated 
Airport Services Association at Nadi 
airport, in western Viti Levu. The 
statement explained that despite the 
ongoing discussions with Air Terminal 
Services (ats) Management regarding 
the workers’ long-term grievances, 
the ats management did not appear 
to commit to addressing any of the 
concerns. Among the issues workers 
wanted resolved was the reinstatement 
of workers’ representatives on the ats 
Board. More than 360 out of the 588 
workers then opted for strike action 
because of this impasse (Chaudhary 
2017). 
On 16 December 2017, an indus-
trial dispute erupted between the ats 
Fiji Limited workers, who are 49 
percent shareholders of the company, 
and the management of the company. 
The Fiji government owns the other 
51 percent of the shares. Workers met 
to discuss long-standing grievances, 
ongoing for more than ten years. 
Approximately 250 ats workers were 
locked out of their offices when they 
attended a three-hour shareholders’ 
meeting. When workers returned to 
work after their meeting, they found 
they were locked out of their offices 
by the ats management team. Fiji’s 
minister for labor and employment 
relations, without listening to the 
facts of the case or taking the indus-
trial dispute to arbitration, ruled the 
workers meeting as illegal from day 
one of the lockout. Workers were then 
immediately told by ats management 
to sign a form stating that the workers 
were in the wrong and, additionally, 
that the workers were willing to return 
to work, pending management’s deci-
sion on the alleged “illegal meeting.” 
The ats workers refused to sign the 
form and continued to sit outside the 
ats building at Nadi airport, await-
ing further negotiations by their union 
leaders and ats management. 
On Saturday, 13 January 2018, the 
Fiji Trade Union Congress (ftuc), 
together with other unions, nongov-
ernmental organizations, political 
parties, representatives of chiefs and 
vanua, communities, church groups, 
and individuals, participated in the 
largest peaceful protest march in Nadi 
town. More than eight thousand 
people participated in this peaceful 
march in support of the locked-out 
ats workers. Prior to this march, Fiji’s 
prime minister had labeled groups that 
visited the locked-out ats workers as 
“cheap politicians” (Bolatiki 2018). 
However, the message was loud and 
clear to the Fiji First Government that 
the workers/shareholders of the com-
pany were adamant to continue sitting 
out until their grievances were heard. 
After thirty-four days of waiting to be 
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allowed back into their workplaces, 
on 20 January 2018, the Employment 
Relations Tribunal ruled in favor of 
the ats workers/shareholders and 
ordered that locked-out workers be 
allowed back into their workplaces 
within forty-eight hours of the ruling. 
Workers returned to work on  Monday, 
22 January 2018.
After the ats workers returned 
to work, Felix Anthony, the general 
secretary of the Fiji Trade Union 
Congress, was interrogated by the Fiji 
Police about “sabotaging the econ-
omy,” which is an offense under sec-
tion 8 of the Public Order Act in Fiji. 
As Anthony explained, the Fiji Police 
suggested that his remarks  during 
the march implied a possibility of a 
nationwide strike if government did 
not act to resolve the ats saga. This, 
the police asserted, was tantamount to 
sabotaging Fiji’s economy (Radio New 
Zealand 2018). Guy Ryder, the direc-
tor general of the International Labor 
Organization (ilo), was contacted to 
intervene urgently on the unfolding 
industrial dispute in Fiji. The Interna-
tional Transport Workers’ Federation 
(itwf) and International Trade Union 
Confederation said in a statement that 
“they had no choice but to alert the 
ilo, and that the government in Fiji 
must act and stop this unacceptable 
behaviour,” and, according to itwf 
president Paddy Crumlin, “this looks 
like a process of deliberate intimida-
tion aimed at Felix Anthony and all 
the workers who stood up for their 
rights over the ats lockout” (Radio 
New Zealand 2018). 
Industrial disputes have created 
their own political dynamics in Fiji’s 
political history throughout the 
colonial and postcolonial periods. In 
1987, the seventeen-year reign of Ratu 
Mara’s Alliance Party ended when the 
newly formed Fiji Labour Party Coali-
tion defeated it. A march through 
Nadi town on 13 January 2018 by 
more than eight thousand workers 
and supporters in a show of solidarity 
for the locked-out ats workers was 
a warning sign to Bainimarama’s Fiji 
First government that history could 
repeat itself in the 2018 election. 
Labour solidarity has always crossed 
the ethnic divide and made political 
history in Fiji.
alumita durutalo
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New Caledonia
The year 2017 was said to be the 
last useful year to promote a calm 
and consensual completion of the 
Nouméa Agreement before the 2018 
referendum on independence. It has 
indeed seemed to be a transitional 
year. The previous year of 2016, 
which was a preelection year in 
metropolitan France, revealed some 
key events related to the collapse of 
the nickel price, which put the three 
nickel plants in New Caledonia—the 
Le Nickel Society (sln) in Nouméa, 
Vale in the South, and the Northern 
Province plant of Glencore—and the 
upstream mining activity at risk. The 
nickel industry accounts for a quarter 
of  private-sector employment in the 
country and 90 percent of its exports 
(Delamarche 2016c). The country 
is footing the bill for the increase in 
building costs and low local competi-
tiveness. During his trip to New Cale-
donia, French Prime Minister Manuel 
Valls announced a €200 million loan 
for the Société Territoriale Calédoni-
enne de Participations Industrielles 
(stcpi, the holding company run by 
the three provinces of New Caledo-
nia, which holds a 34 percent minor-
ity share of the sln) (Delamarche 
2016a). (€1 million = us$1.2 million.) 
In November, Prime Minister Valls 
announced strong financial support 
for the Vale Plant, as he had done in 
April 2016 for the sln. To prevent 
its possible closure, Valls pledged a 
€200 million loan and an additional 
financial guarantee for €220 million 
(Delamarche 2016b). The situation 
of the Northern plant was still to 
be resolved. In November 2016, the 
French government announced that 
502 the contemporary pacific • 30:2 (2018)
Glencore would not have to reimburse 
a €200 million tax exemption, the 
same amount the other two plants had 
received. In total, €600 million was 
lent to the three plants, the repayment 
of which is assessed as unlikely. Offer-
ing job subsidies is a classic strategy in 
French politics. The aid was most wel-
come because it allowed the country to 
pursue its dream of wealth and avoid 
any reform of the French Overseas 
way of life. It had the huge advantage 
of enabling the French government 
to be the savior of New Caledonia. 
The primary disadvantage was that 
this meant that important economic 
 decisions could be postponed.
The year 2017 was strongly influ-
enced by 2016. The country’s financial 
situation has remained on standby, 
waiting for the recovery in commodity 
prices and impending political dead-
lines. There was also a strong mes-
sage from the French government to 
the local one to make a “Keynesian” 
budget deficit in order to stimulate the 
economy. Nonetheless, 2017 has been 
a year of economic slowdown and 
budgetary restraint, obscured by the 
increasing public debt of the country. 
Local tax exemptions for the building 
industry have fostered the illusion of 
economic boom, which has been paid 
for with massive budget deficits and 
increasing inequalities (Gorohouna 
2017). The government’s economic 
strategy since 2008 has been a mix 
of “Keynesian” voluntary public 
spending and trickle-down econom-
ics (Chauchat 2017). A “wait and 
see” attitude seems to have prevailed. 
 Nevertheless, 2017 has not been a 
wasted year, as the New Caledonian 
government has not foregone all 
change.
The Government of New Caledonia 
has been trying to curb health-care 
costs as it has strived to balance its 
welfare budget. Health-care expen-
diture, which has doubled in the last 
ten years, has risen at a faster rate 
than the growth of the gross domestic 
product. The economic system has 
exhausted all of its funds, while at the 
same time New Caledonia has built 
new health-care infrastructure and 
facilities—a brand-new hospital in the 
South, a private polyclinic in Nouméa, 
and a new Northern hospital—which 
are oversized for the population of 
the island. Without any major deci-
sions being made by the government, 
 Valentine Eurisouké, the member of 
the government in charge of health 
care, has begun to push this issue 
with a view to achieving a success-
ful outcome by saving on costs and 
seeking new revenue streams. Working 
under pressure, the government has 
increased alcohol and tobacco taxes.
Finally, in December 2017, the 
Congress of New Caledonia accepted 
the names of the members of the new 
Competition Authority, which will 
enforce antitrust law. The members of 
the authority were mostly people from 
overseas and France, with, as usual, 
very high salaries. Aurélie Zoude-Le 
Berre, currently director in the French 
National Assembly and appointed to 
the Legislation Committee, will be the 
chairperson. The rapporteur will be 
Virginie Cramesnil de Laleu, mag-
istrate in Paris. The other members 
are Jean-Michel Stoltz, magistrate in 
Nouméa; Matthieu Buchberger, senior 
lecturer at the University of New Cale-
donia; and Robert Philip Simpson, a 
British citizen, who has set up similar 
authorities in Africa.
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Replacing customs duties with a 
“General Consumption Tax” (tgc), 
based on added value like a Goods 
and Services Tax (gst), has been a 
major change. The reform started 
with a dry run beginning 1 April 2017 
(Réné 2017) and should enter into 
force in July 2018. Thus, the country 
has still been trying to remove cus-
toms duties (which have given New 
Caledonian industries a competitive 
advantage over imports) and to create 
a more neutral tax. Nevertheless, the 
transition phase might be accompa-
nied by protection of local industry. 
This is why the government has pro-
posed a new tax, the “Cyclical Import 
Tax for the Protection of Local Manu-
facturing” (payable on taxable imports 
competing with local producers), 
and has also proposed a reduced tgc 
rate for local manufacturing. These 
two actions would strongly limit the 
inevitable exposure to regional trade, 
a debate that is ongoing in  Congress 
today. Maybe the system could be 
simplified by applying only one tax 
rate instead of five. Nobody yet knows 
if the tax will come into force in July 
2018 (Caprais 2018).
At the end of 2016, a center of 
unrest and insecurity—marked by 
gunfire against police and inhabitants 
and recurrent roadblocks—emerged in 
St Louis, a Kanak enclave located in 
Greater Nouméa, in the town of Mont 
Dore (Wéry 2017). Nicknamed the 
“white city,” Nouméa built its history 
as a city of discrimination and exclu-
sion against the Kanak people, who 
were pushed to the margins of society 
(Dussy 2015, 147, 368). Ethnic and 
spatial segregation of the population 
is still the most significant feature of 
New Caledonia. Therefore, talking 
about insecurity has quickly turned 
into talking about Kanak delinquency 
against all of the “others.” In the pre-
vailing political climate, this issue is 
also used as a reminder of the French 
government’s responsibility for law 
and order in this multicultural country. 
The incidents were politicized to such 
an extent that on 2 February 2017 the 
Political Bureau of the flnks (Socialist 
Kanak National Liberation Front) had 
to call for calm, restraint, and mod-
eration. Huge public demonstrations 
followed the death of a young nurse 
in front of the St Louis enclave while 
she was commuting home. In June, the 
public prosecutor made a statement 
explaining that the death was caused 
by young people frightening the nurse, 
causing her to fall while they were 
trying to steal her motorbike. On 
16 January 2017, French Minister of 
Justice Jean-Jacques Urvoas issued an 
administrative circular outlining the 
French government’s new priorities 
for law and order. This penal policy 
was strongly influenced by the strife 
in St Louis. The minister emphasized 
tougher law enforcement for damage 
to persons and property, cannabis 
and drug dealing, the use of alcohol, 
domestic violence, and violence on the 
road, but he did not say a word about 
fighting white-collar crime (Urvoas 
2017). 
Meanwhile, preparations are going 
on for the referendum on indepen-
dence. The questions on which con-
sultation should be sought are already 
written in the Nouméa Agreement: 
“Do you agree with New Caledonia 
fulfilling sovereign functions (foreign 
affairs, justice, defence, public order, 
and currency)? Do you agree with an 
international status for the country? 
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Do you agree with a new nationality?” 
These are three inseparable questions, 
which can only be responded to by 
a “Yes” or “No.” However, the Yes 
and No are unbalanced. If you answer 
No, things remain unchanged. If you 
answer Yes, you throw yourself into 
a void, which is much more problem-
atic. That is why in 2017 the pro-
independence parties had to publish 
a “projet de société” (blueprint for 
a future political and socioeconomic 
system) to move forward. From the 
perspective of the anti-independence 
parties, the status quo should continue 
indefinitely.
The Caledonian Union, the  oldest 
political party in New Caledonia, 
unveiled its projet de société in 
 January. The Palika (Liberation Kanak 
Party) followed in March. Then, the 
pro-independence umbrella organiza-
tion flnks, which is responsible for 
claiming independence before the 
United Nations General Assembly, 
drew up a synthesis of those two plans 
during its 35th congress, with their 
common aim being that Kanaky–
New Caledonia would become “a 
multi cultural, democratic, secular 
and united Republic.”  Socialism 
“would be enshrined as one of the 
most important principles,” as pro-
claimed in the 1986 Constitution of 
Kanaky, which is deposited at the 
United Nations. Socialism would 
today identify with public policies 
such as  rebalancing power between 
Kanaks and non-Kanaks, control over 
strategic resources, fair distribution 
of wealth, working with semipublic 
companies, and, more largely, creating 
a mixed economy with both private 
and public enterprises.  “Socialism 
in action” would be what the flnks 
proposed for the people in the future 
independent state. A revolution 
clearly hasn’t been necessary. Some 
parts of the Nouméa  Agreement 
have not been reconsidered by the 
constituent  political parties of the 
flnks. Indeed, the constitutional 
status of New  Caledonia was crafted 
to  prevent a majority from holding 
 political power. Its aim was to lead 
to a  consensus between the political 
forces, both Kanak and non-Kanak, 
without going straight to a deadlock. 
Thus,  political power was shared, 
and this was accepted as  common 
consent. 
First, the establishment of three 
provinces as regional councils has 
resulted in the sharing of power 
on a regional basis. That might be 
maintained, if slightly limited by 
the  creation of a coordinating body 
between the presidents of the three 
provinces under the supervision of 
the president of New Caledonia’s 
 government. Second, the power inside 
the government itself has been shared. 
The Nouméa Agreement provided 
that the members of  government may 
be elected by the New  Caledonia 
 Congress under a system of pro-
portional representation. So, all of 
the main political parties may join 
the government. This was called the 
 “Collegial Policy.” That might be 
maintained. Nevertheless, under the 
new plan, a president of the  republic 
would be elected by Congress, whose 
new name would be “National 
 Assembly,” together with the 
 provincial assemblies, the Customary 
Senate, and the mayors. The flnks 
was silent on the subject of the right to 
dissolve  Parliament, but the movement 
confirmed the principles of the 1986 
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Constitution of Kanaky, which gave 
the president of the republic that right. 
Registered voters in the provincial 
elections, namely, those who have 
New Caledonian citizenship, as well as 
the people who can vote in the refer-
endum, would acquire the nationality 
of the new, independent country. A 
law would establish the conditions of 
acquisition, loss, and recovery of New 
Caledonian citizenship by birth or 
descent. Maintaining French national-
ity, as a dual-nationality status, would 
be an open option to discuss with 
France (NC Presse 2017c). The land 
question, which would trigger con-
frontations and division, would be a 
main priority for the new nation, in 
order to foster a desire to live together. 
As is currently the case, the new inde-
pendent country would maintain three 
types of land tenure: public property, 
private property, and customary land. 
New Caledonian citizenship would 
facilitate priority access to real estate. 
Regarding sovereign functions, the 
new independent state would join 
the United Nations and open dip-
lomatic and consular services in the 
Pacific region and in France. Public 
order would be maintained by only 
one entity of public servants, created 
by merging the gendarmerie with 
the municipal and national police. 
Defense would involve the creation of 
a national army, sized according to the 
needs and means of the country. The 
flnks would create a military service, 
based on the model of France’s current 
sma (Overseas Adapted Military Ser-
vice). New multilateral and bilateral 
defense accords would be negotiated 
with France and neighboring coun-
tries. Regarding the justice system, a 
break with the French tradition should 
be noted: The judicial system would 
be a unified combination of the special 
administrative courts and the judi-
ciary, with a supreme court at the top. 
A customary court would be main-
tained for customary civil affairs. For 
the flnks, having a Kanaky national 
currency pegged to a basket of stable 
international currencies would seem 
the most promising monetary option. 
The option of the euro replacing the 
French Pacific franc has been ruled 
out. Finally, the flnks has proposed 
“Kanaky–New Caledonia” as the 
country’s name and the “Kanaky 
flag” as the national flag. This flag 
was raised for the very first time on 
1 December 1984 by Jean-Marie 
Tjibaou at La Conception.
On 28 June 2017, Flavien Misoni, 
head of the UN expert group, submit-
ted the situation report regarding the 
revision of the special rolls for the 
 provincial elections and the referen-
dum. Following a first task force in 
2016, the twelve UN experts have 
been working throughout the coun-
try, observing the working process of 
the special administrative verification 
commissions in charge of the revision 
proceedings. Their aim has been to 
look into the reliability and exhaustive 
nature of the special electoral rolls, so 
that the result would be indisputable. 
Their main observation has been that 
not all the people who could enroll 
had done so, especially Kanaks. A 
great demonstration in favor of auto-
matic enrollment of all Kanaks took 
place in July. Once again, this was 
proof that this particular issue is sensi-
tive and mobilizing Kanak support.
On 2 November 2017, the Signa-
tory Committee of the Nouméa Agree-
ment met in Paris to find a compro-
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mise regarding the exhaustive nature 
of the electoral roll for the referen-
dum. An independence referendum 
is typically designed for people who 
have been colonized—in this case, 
the Kanak people. However, the first 
compromise of the Nouméa Agree-
ment was to give the right to vote 
both to Kanaks and to other people 
with twenty years’ residency before 
the 31 December 2014 deadline. As 
a result, the Kanak people made up 
barely 50 percent of the electoral 
body. Because according to French 
law being registered on the electoral 
roll is voluntary, many Kanak people 
were not registered. Consequently, 
they would not be able to vote in the 
upcoming referendum. The new politi-
cal compromise has been to register 
them automatically. Although this 
will be done by law, it does not mean 
that all of the enrolled people will go 
to the polls and vote. As a political 
counterpart, the pro-independence 
parties have agreed that the right to 
vote will be given to all people born in 
New Caledonia with only three years 
of permanent residence—in other 
words, including people traveling to 
and from France without close ties 
with the country. Theoretically, there 
should be three times more Kanaks 
benefiting from the new situation than 
non-Kanaks. However, these disputes 
about the electoral roll have sent a 
clear message: all the political parties, 
and the French government, expect a 
vote split along ethnic lines, Kanaks 
against all the others. Could anything 
good emerge from such a vote? The 
new law will only come into effect 
after the first revision of the electoral 
roll in March 2018. Consequently, the 
French government will open an addi-
tional period to register just before the 
vote. This late enrollment will make it 
very difficult for the pro-independence 
parties to make the people who never 
vote aware of the importance of 
doing so.
Finally, in October 2017, pro-
independence and anti-independence 
parties, as well as the president of the 
New Caledonia government, took 
part in the debate about decoloniza-
tion of New Caledonia before the 4th 
Commission of the 72nd UN General 
Assembly. This was most likely the 
last UN meeting before the 2018 vote 
(NC Presse 2017b).
On 16 and 17 March 2017, the 
very first meeting between the French 
diplomatic network for Oceania and 
the New Caledonian government 
took place in Nouméa (NC Presse 
2017a). The aim of the talks was to 
define a shared international policy 
between the French government and 
New Caledonia in terms of regional 
 integration—in other words, this 
would show that regional integra-
tion could take place without full 
sovereignty. The discussion between 
France and New Caledonia also 
focused on a concerted strategy for 
New Caledonia to work with both 
France and the European Union in 
Oceania. On the topic of bilateral 
cooperation, the French government 
has committed to go along with New 
Caledonia for the implementation of 
joint projects already signed with New 
Zealand, Vanuatu, and, in due course, 
 Australia.  
For New Caledonia, 2017 has been 
a diplomatic banner year. After New 
Caledonia joined the International 
Organization of Francophonie (iof) in 
November 2016 (Government of New 
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Caledonia 2016), Philippe Germain, 
the president of the New Caledo-
nian government, was in Vanuatu on 
3 March 2017 to sign a joint coopera-
tion framework. This framework is 
related to eleven activity segments, 
namely, tourism, biosecurity, cus-
toms, education, higher education, 
health, water conveyance, sanitation, 
transports, digital technology, and 
Francophonie (French language and 
culture). During this trip, the New 
Caledonian delegation—consisting of 
President Philippe Germain; Valentine 
Eurisouké, member of government 
in charge of health; Gérard Poadja, 
deputy-president of the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee of Congress; Karine 
De Frémont, director of the French 
Development Agency; Gaël Lagadec, 
president of the University of New 
Caledonia; and Bernard  Pelletier, 
 scientific director of the French 
Research Institute for Development—
went to the iof headquarters to sign 
an agreement with Vanuatu and the 
French Development Agency regarding 
the founding of the Vanuatu National 
University project. 
Approved in September 2016 by the 
member states of the Pacific Islands 
Forum (pif) (Moureaux 2016), the 
first participation of New Caledonia 
as a full member at a pif summit 
took place in November 2017 in Apia 
(Sāmoa), along with French Polyne-
sia (Government of New Caledonia 
2017). The president of the New 
Caledonian government attended with 
the other leaders and also participated 
in the leaders’ retreat, a confiden-
tial meeting limited to the leaders. 
Philippe Germain strongly emphasized 
that New Caledonia would be more 
actively involved in the pif, drawing 
on its privileged relations with the 
European Union. 
Finally, on 30 October 2017, during 
the 39th session of unesco’s General 
Conference in Paris, New Caledonia 
became a new associate member of the 
international organization (unesco 
2017). This was the first time for the 
country to join a global international 
organization and also the first time 
for a French overseas territory to join 
unesco. 
Despite international policy 
 appearances, New Caledonia is still a 
part of France, so French political life 
has a strong influence on local events. 
In New Caledonia, there is a dual 
political calendar: the French national 
calendar, for elections in metropoli-
tan France, which affects all French 
people living in the country, and the 
local one, for the provincial elections, 
which only involves New Caledonian 
citizens. During the French elections, 
political parties speak to all French 
citizens, while, during local  elections, 
they only address New  Caledonian 
 citizens. As a result,  political life 
can be complex and sometimes 
 contradictory. 
On 23 April and 7 May 2017, the 
French presidential election caused 
a surprise in France with the success 
of Emmanuel Macron. In the first 
round, in New Caledonia, Macron 
(leader of a new centrist party, En 
Marche) came in third with only 
12.75 percent of the votes, behind 
François  Fillon (Les Républicains, 
31.13%) and Marine Le Pen (the 
far-right Front National, 29.09%). 
In the second round, Macron won 
52.57 percent of the votes in New 
Caledonia versus 47.43 percent for 
his challenger Marine Le Pen. Philippe 
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Gomès (Calédonie Ensemble) called 
on people to vote for Macron, while 
Pierre Frogier (Les Républicains) 
spoke in favor of their adherents 
not voting for either Macron or Le 
Pen; Sonia Backès (Les Républicains 
calédoniens, a rebel faction of the 
party) did not give any instructions in 
the second round of the presidential 
election. On 11 and 18 June 2017, the 
French parliamentary elections quickly 
followed the presidential campaign. 
New Caledonia has two members of 
the French National Assembly and, as 
a result of gerrymandering in 1986, 
no pro-independence representative 
could be elected. The electorates had 
been changed to astutely mix the 
votes of people living in the urban 
conglomeration of Nouméa with the 
Kanak votes in the Loyalty Islands or 
the Northern Province. An indicator 
of the inconsistencies in political life 
was the Caledonian Union’s refusal 
to take part in the French national 
legislative elections, despite the fact 
that Palika (Kanak Liberation Party) 
decided to participate. Therefore, only 
the anti- independence parties were 
involved. In the first constituency 
(the city of  Nouméa and the Loyalty 
Islands), where Deputy Mayor Sonia 
Lagarde did not seek reelection due to 
holding multiple other offices, Philippe 
Dunoyer (Calédonie Ensemble) was 
elected with 59.15 percent of the votes 
against Sonia Backès (Les Répub-
licains Calédoniens). In the second 
constituency (the suburbs of Nouméa 
and the main island, Grande Terre), 
Philippe Gomès (Calédonie Ensemble) 
was reelected with 54.95 percent 
of the votes against Louis Mapou 
(National Union for Independence–
Palika). The latest agreement between 
four anti-independence political move-
ments boosted this double victory: 
Philippe Gomès (Calédonie Ensemble), 
Pierre Frogier (Le Rassemblement-Les 
Républicains), Gaël Yanno (former 
member of the French Parliament 
who leads the Mouvement Populaire 
Calédonien, a rebel faction of the 
party Le Rassemblement), and Pascal 
Vittori (Tous Calédoniens) signed “a 
joint statement for New Caledonia 
in France and in peace,” which sent 
Sonia Backès to the opposition. This 
strife between the anti-independence 
parties paved the way for a new 
 government crisis.
Following the resignation of the 
political group Calédonie Ensemble 
from the government, as a result of 
the election of Philippe Dunoyer as 
member of the National Assembly, 
the New Caledonian collegial govern-
ment itself had to resign. There was 
no other member on the reserve list 
to join the government. Thus, a new 
election of the government by Con-
gress was mandatory. On 24 August 
2017, the first meeting of the New 
Caledonia Congress determined the 
number of members of government, 
keeping it at 11. Six votes out of 11 
were necessary to elect the president 
of government. On one side, there 
were 5 who had signed the joint state-
ment, on the other side, there were 5 
pro-independence members, and the 
eleventh member was Sonia Backès, 
who did not sign the joint statement. 
The situation remained deadlocked 
for three months until 1 December 
2017, when the pro-independence 
parties finally gave their votes to the 
president, Philippe Germain, who was 
reelected with 10 votes out of 11. This 
happened just before the visit of the 
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French prime minister to New Caledo-
nia. On 22 December 2017, the newly 
elected president made his general 
policy statement to Congress. 
In March 2017, the French 
National Assembly Information Com-
mittee “on the future institutional 
framework for New Caledonia” made 
its last visit to New Caledonia prior to 
the parliamentary elections. The chair-
man was Dominique Bussereau (Les 
Républicains) and the rapporteur was 
René Dosière (Parti Socialiste), two 
men who know the country very well. 
One key event during this visit was the 
meeting with students at the Univer-
sity of New Caledonia, which was 
celebrating its thirtieth anniversary. 
On 28 March 2017, the committee 
submitted its report (National Assem-
bly of France 2017), analyzing various 
possible futures for the country. This 
report will be very useful to the new 
elected successors, who will have to 
take charge of the next committee. On 
3 October 2017, Manuel Valls, former 
prime minister of France, was elected 
as the new chairman of the committee, 
whose rapporteurs are now Christian 
Jacob (Les Républicains) and Yaël 
Braun-Pivet (En Marche), the newly 
elected chairman of the Legislation 
Committee of the National Assembly. 
In December, Dominique Bussereau, 
former chairman of the committee, 
and Jean-Jacques Urvoas, former min-
ister of justice, came for a final visit to 
New Caledonia, having been invited 
by the University of New Caledonia 
to contribute to the symposium on 
the future institutional framework for 
New Caledonia (University of New 
Caledonia 2017). 
The visit of the new French presi-
dent, Emmanuel Macron, is awaited 
in May 2018. Édouard Philippe, 
appointed French prime minister in 
April 2017, came to New Caledonia 
from 1 to 5 December. On 5 Decem-
ber 2017, Philippe gave an important 
speech before the New Caledonia 
Congress (Government of France 
2017). He played down the impact of 
the referendum, calling it “a sidestep 
in the march toward dialogue.” He 
used the term “Caledonian people,” 
going beyond the terms of the Nou-
méa Agreement, which had recog-
nized the “Kanak people” alongside 
the “French people,” sharing for a 
while the same nationality and joining 
together in “a common destiny.” He 
seemed to have borrowed the vocabu-
lary from Member of the National 
Assembly Philippe Gomès. Philippe 
confirmed that, to implement the 
recommendations of the Signatory 
Committee of the Nouméa Agreement 
beginning in November 2017, the 
changes concerning enrollment to vote 
on the Organic Institutional Law will 
be effective in 2018. 
Philippe initiated the establishment 
of a new restricted group, nicknamed 
the “Group of Ten,” which will 
have the responsibility of  discussing 
the future. This Group of Ten has 
four pro-independence members: 
Roch Wamytan, Daniel Goa, Paul 
 Néaoutyine, and Victor Tutugoro; 
and six anti-independence members: 
Philippe Gomès, Philippe Michel, Gaël 
Yanno, Sonia Backès, Thierry Santa, 
and Bernard Deladrière. Philippe also 
initiated the establishment of a second 
committee, named the “Group of 
the Wise,” which will “ensure [that] 
the campaign rhetorics won’t hurt 
the Caledonian society in its values, 
those coming from the Declaration 
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of the Rights of man and of Citizens, 
those coming from the customary 
Kanak society, those coming from 
the religious heritage and those from 
the preamble of the Nouméa Agree-
ment.” This Group of the Wise is 
composed of the former mayors of 
Bourail,  Nouméa, and Koumac, Taïeb 
Jean Pierre Aïfa, Jean Lèques, and 
Robert Frouin; Father Rock Api-
kaoua; a  Wallisian customary chief, 
Sosefo Falaeo; Deputy President of 
the Economic, Social, and Environ-
mental Council Jean-Pierre Flotat; the 
president of the association SoS sexual 
violence, Anne-Marie Mestre; the 
president of Human Rights League, 
Elie Poigoune; Marie-Claude Tjibaou, 
the widow of Jean-Marie Tjibaou; 
the former director of  the Agency for 
the Development of Kanak Culture, 
Octave Togna; the very first Kanak 
magistrate, Fote Trolue; and the for-
mer director of the Protestant Church 
School, Billy Wapotro.
mathias chauchat
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Papua
Toward the end of 2017, during their 
annual meeting in Port Vila, Vanuatu, 
Papuan leaders elected new leaders 
for the United Liberation Movement 
for West Papua (ulmwp), who will 
serve the term of 2018–2021. There 
was also a significant change in the 
way they organize themselves. If the 
 previous leadership was organized 
around the ulmwp secretary-general, 
suggesting the principle of first among 
equals, the new structure took on 
a more hierarchical shape. Benny 
Wenda is at the top of the pyramid 
as chair, with Octo Mote, the for-
mer  secretary-general, as deputy; 
the  position of secretary-general is 
now held by Rex Rumakiek. Jacob 
Rumbiak is tasked with the spokes-
person role. The composition of 
 personnel, however, remains largely 
the same. New faces are Paula 
 Makabory as treasurer and Oridek 
Ap as an executive member; both are 
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Papuan exiles who reside in Australia 
and the Netherlands, respectively.
This restructuring is reminiscent of 
similar dynamics that occurred back 
in 2000 when Papuans were about to 
establish the Presidium Dewan Papua 
(Papua Presidium Council, or pdp) 
during the historic Second Papuan 
Congress in Jayapura, which the 
author attended. During their delibera-
tions, the late Theys Eluay proclaimed 
himself chair and appointed Tom 
Beanal as his pdp deputy. This action 
was different from the original design 
of pdp, which the Musyawarah Besar 
(Great Deliberation; mubes) Papua 
had adopted. The original structure 
put emphasis on collegiality and equal 
participation of all leaders in order to 
accommodate representatives of all 
sides of Papuan politics. Over the next 
three years, the new ulmwp leader-
ship has to prove to their constituents 
how effective it can be in implement-
ing the mandate, which is first and 
foremost to advocate for the right to 
self-determination of Papuans. 
If we look back over the last twelve 
months, ulmwp was effective in 
 penetrating international politics by 
securing more international recogni-
tion beyond the Pacific. During the 
72nd Session of the UN General 
Assembly in September 2017, the 
case of Papua was raised again by 
the coalition of the willing: Vanuatu, 
Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, and the 
Caribbean nation of St Vincent and 
the Grenadines (rnz 2017a). Despite 
having a smaller number of advocates 
than in the 71st Session, they managed 
to attract another fiery response from 
the Indonesian delegation. Instead of 
presenting new facts, the Indonesians 
were dismissive and described the 
Papua statement as a “hoax” (rnz 
2017a, 2017b).
Another diplomatic effort occurred 
in October 2017 when Benny Wenda, 
who was then the ulmwp spokesper-
son, submitted a petition to the UN 
Special Committee on Decolonization 
(also known as the UN Committee of 
24) stating that 1.8 million Papuans 
had signed the document (Doherty 
and Lamb 2017). The UN Committee 
rejected the petition, arguing that its 
mandate is confined to dealing only 
with the seventeen states identified 
by the United Nations as “non-self-
governing territories” (rnz 2017b). 
Although it did not attract significant 
attention in the Indonesian national 
media, the petition drew controversy 
within the Papuan community. One 
of the core questions concerns the 
purported 1.8 million signatures. The 
total population of both provinces in 
the Island of Papua is around 3.2 mil-
lion, including both Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous Papuans. If the 1.8 
million figure is accurate, it would 
mean that 56 percent of inhabitants of 
the whole of Papua signed the petition, 
which might not necessarily reflect 
the reality of Papuan demography. 
More importantly, one might question 
whether the UN Committee of 24 is 
the most feasible venue to promote 
the right to self-determination for 
 Papuans, given the fact that Indonesia 
is a member of the committee. More-
over, the chair of the UN Committee 
explicitly states that its narrow man-
date limits its ability to deal with any 
other issues beyond the official UN list 
of non-self-governing territories.
Apart from engaging the UN ven-
ues, we should not forget that Papua’s 
pending membership application for 
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the Melanesian Spearhead Group 
(msg) remains unresolved. The msg 
member states seem unable to come 
to a decision that might satisfy both 
ulmwp and Indonesia. This will be 
discussed in the next msg Summit in 
Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea in 
2018.
While high-level politics and inter-
national diplomacy have attracted 
major resources of the Government 
of Indonesia, the ulmwp, and the 
region, Papuan daily life seems to be 
presented merely as a backdrop for the 
political statements by both state and 
non-state political actors. There is a 
disconnect between high-level politics 
and the low quality of public services, 
incompetent local governments, and 
unstoppable land grabbing caused by 
extractive industry. It should be noted, 
however, that the first two issues are 
not unique to Papua. Rather, these are 
common phenomena across Indonesia. 
Services for health, the micro economy, 
and basic education in both rural and 
urban centers remain inadequate due to 
governmental mismanagement. Toward 
the end of 2017, thirty-three regents 
(district heads) had been arrested by 
the Indonesian Corruption Eradica-
tion Commission (Komisi Pemberan-
tasan Korupsi, or kpk) on corruption 
charges (Kabar24.com 2017). The cor-
ruption scandal that involves members 
of the national Parliament on the case 
of Indonesian national identity cards is 
even worse, as it constitutes the largest 
graft case in Indonesian history (Agus 
and others 2017b).
If we look at the Human Develop-
ment Index (hdi) of all Indonesian 
provinces over the last decade, both 
provinces of Papua are at the bottom 
of the ladder. The 2016 hdi for West 
Papua Province is 62.21 and for Papua 
is 58.05, which means they are both 
below the Indonesia national stan-
dard (70.18) (Badan Pusat Statistik 
2017). The Indonesian delegation to 
the UN General Assembly overlooked 
this reality when it claimed that both 
 provinces have the top economic 
growth in the country. A blanket 
macro indicator has grossly distorted 
our understanding of the detailed 
 reality of daily life in Papua. 
Nevertheless, hdi statistics are 
only abstractions of concrete reality 
and thus tend to conceal real human 
faces. We should investigate the daily 
life of Papuans in order to assess the 
reality, given that Papua was granted 
the Special Autonomy package in 
2001. Moreover, since that time, the 
last three consecutive governments 
(Megawati, Yudhoyono, and Widodo) 
adopted the same policy of “acceler-
ating” development in Papua. This 
means these governments share the 
same logic of increasing economic 
growth in order to uplift the welfare 
standard of Papuans. The following 
examples confront the validity of this 
assumption.
The first iconic example stems 
from the daily struggle for survival 
by Papuan women as a result of the 
dire condition of the microeconomy. 
Pasar Mama Papua, the market for 
Indigenous Papuan women traders in 
downtown Jayapura was built only 
after a seemingly ever-pending con-
struction period. The market was the 
fruit of a long struggle by the Papuan 
women traders after being collectively 
organized by the Office for Justice 
and Peace of the Catholic Diocese of 
Jayapura in 2005, when the author 
was director there. 
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It took more than a decade before 
the new market, constructed by the 
national and local governments, was 
finished, thanks to the advocacy work 
of Solidaritas Pedagang Asli Papua 
(Solidarity Forum for the Indigenous 
Papuan Traders, or solpap). The 
organization is a coalition between 
the women traders and young  Papuan 
activists. Pokja Papua, a  government 
task force under the Ministry of State 
Owned Enterprises, took the lead 
in the market construction follow-
ing its inauguration by President 
Joko Widodo on 30 April 2016 (icp 
2017, 104). However, Pokja went 
one step further when it tried to 
impose its halal stamp on the mar-
ket by  introducing the idea that the 
women should sell beef instead of 
pork. The decision immediately met 
strong criticism from solpap (Tabloid 
Jubi 2017c). “Of course, we rejected 
it,” said Frengky Warer, the solpap 
coordinator (pers comm, Jan 2018). 
The solidarity group argues that it 
would cause a new and unnecessary 
problem, as beef is never a product of 
the Papuan women. This development 
would have gone unnoticed had the 
local media not picked up the issue. 
However, none of the solidarity 
groups inside or outside Papua take 
this issue seriously or recognize it as 
a subtle but effective way of destroy-
ing Papuan identity in the long run. 
In Melanesian cultures, pig and pork 
have a vital role, not only for nutrition 
but for maintaining cultural tradi-
tions that involve pigs. For instance, 
the dowries of the Papuan highlander 
women are settled with pigs. Major 
social feasts must have pork as the 
main course through the bakar batu 
(pig feast) gathering. If a time comes 
when Papuan women are no longer 
able to sell pork in their own land, this 
would signal the extinction of Papuan 
identity, as Papuans would no longer 
be able to perform proper  marriage 
feasts or any other pork-related 
 rituals.
This decade-long struggle for a 
marketplace illustrates the lack of 
response on the part of local govern-
ments toward their own people. Far 
from the romanticized image of a 
heroic narrative, the struggle has been 
marked with frustration, internal 
disagreements, and ongoing rivalry 
between different ethnic groupings. 
Nevertheless, they survive and remain 
resilient under solpap (Tabloid Jubi 
2017b). If the Indigenous Papuan 
women in the provincial capital 
of  Jayapura have had to struggle 
for more than a decade to have a 
 marketplace, many Papuan women 
likely receive no better treatment by 
their respective mayors and regents 
across Papua. 
In a similar vein, the health 
 services were no better off. The year 
of 2017 was marked by a number 
of disease outbreaks that hit several 
isolated spots of Papua. The one 
that attracted major public attention 
was a measles outbreak in Korowai, 
South Papua. While the disease is 
considered rare and preventable 
by vaccine, it became a common 
 phenomenon in this remote, swampy 
area of Papua. As a result, it cost at 
least nine lives. The World Health 
Organization labels measles as “one 
of the leading causes of death among 
young  children” (who 2018), but 
the  government  vaccination program 
in 2017 was limited to Java. Areas 
 outside Java, including Papua, will 
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receive this  service in 2018 (who 
Indonesia 2017).
Korowai grabbed our attention as 
it attested to the public health policy 
of the province. Unlike most parts of 
Papua where Indigenous communi-
ties have been exposed to the outside 
world, the Korowai people maintain 
their unique way of life by building 
their houses up in trees so that they 
are called the “tree people” (Stasch 
2011). Their area of living is isolated 
socially and geographically from their 
neighbors. This isolation has largely 
contributed to difficulties in accessing 
health services and nutritional sup-
plies. So over the years, the Korowai 
have accumulated health issues that 
led to the outbreak. The problem 
of Korowai is iconic though not 
exclusive. Other areas in Papua have 
 suffered similarly, such as the Regency 
of Deiyai (Tabloid Jubi 2017a). 
Indigenous Papuans in many places 
in Papua remain overwhelmed by the 
penetration of extractive industry in 
various sizes and capacities—from 
small-scale mining companies such as 
Nabire Baru Inc, which is seizing the 
land of the Yeresiam Gua people in 
Nabire (see Hernawan 2017, 349) to 
the giant transnational corporation 
Freeport Indonesia in  Tembagapura, 
which has been  operating on 
Amungme and Kamoro land since 
1967 (McKenna 2015; Poulgrain 
2015). 
In 2017 major internal and exter-
nal issues hit the world’s largest gold 
mine, Freeport Indonesia. Internally, 
Freeport had to deal with the biggest 
strike in its history, involving some 
five thousand workers who demanded 
better working conditions (Taylor and 
Asmarini 2017). The strike caused 
serious impacts on Freeport’s produc-
tion since it forced the company to 
halt operations. As a result, according 
to a Timika businessman, the local 
business plunged by 60 percent (pers 
comm, June 2017). Freeport laid off 
some four thousand workers, which 
prompted a warning from the Indo-
nesian government (The Jakarta Post 
2017).
Apart from industrial relations 
issues, Freeport had to wrestle with 
the new regime of the mining sector 
in Indonesia under Law 4/2009 on 
Mineral and Coal. The law stipu-
lates three main issues: (1) to change 
Freeport International’s contract of 
work to an Izin Usaha Pertambangan 
Khusus (iupk, a special mining busi-
ness permit); (2) to build a smelter 
in Indonesia; and (3) to divest 51 
percent of shares to the public. The 
effect of the law was not immediate. 
Rather, it gave a five-year transition 
period for the mining sector to prepare 
their legal, financial, and operational 
adjustments. The law terminated the 
contract of work’s regime, as the Indo-
nesian state no longer signs deals with 
corporations as equal parties; instead, 
it issues business permits. 
Critics, however, argued that both 
the Yudhoyono and Widodo govern-
ments were not consistent in imple-
menting the Law on Mineral and Coal 
as evidenced by the Presidential Decree 
1/2007 regarding Mining Activities of 
10 January 2017, the Decree of Min-
ister of Energy and Minerals 5/2017, 
and the Decree of Minister of Energy 
and Minerals 6/2017. Ahmad Redi 
described these regulations as a way 
“to save the interests of Freeport Indo-
nesia” (Redi 2017, 88). He argued 
that these regulations have three major 
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flaws. First, the contract of work 
 cannot immediately be replaced with 
an iupk since it requires approval 
from the national Parliament. Second, 
once the law is enforced, corpora-
tions must immediately stop export-
ing ore and start building smelters in 
Indonesia. It means the law gives no 
tolerance for any mining industry to 
export ore. In contrast, the ministerial 
regulation offers five years’ tolerance. 
Third, the Indonesian government’s 
push for Freeport to accept an iupk 
risks infringing on the contract of 
work with evident legal consequences. 
However, among all legal require-
ments, Freeport McMoran Chief 
Executive Officer Richard C Adkerson 
categorically rejected the divestment 
scheme and accused the government 
of expropriating assets. Therefore, 
he warned the government to negoti-
ate the agreement within 120 days; 
otherwise, he would bring Indonesia 
to International Arbitration (Agus and 
others 2017a). Critics, however, sus-
pected that this was merely a strategy 
to put strong pressure on the govern-
ment to bow to Freeport, as Newmont 
Nusa Tenggara had successfully done 
in 2014 (Redi 2017, 89). 
It took nine months of tough 
negotiations before Freeport Indonesia 
agreed to the divestment of shares. 
The agreement, however, stumbled on 
the future management of the com-
pany, as Freeport insisted on having 
final veto power over management 
composition. Therefore, by the end 
of 2017, the issue remains pending, 
including a solution with the workers.
Apart from the whirlwind of 
Freeport Indonesia’s related issues, 
the Papua landscape, which consti-
tutes the livelihood of Indigenous 
communities, has been constantly 
undermined by extractive industry. By 
the end of 2017, six key civil society 
organizations in Papua and Jakarta 
jointly issued an important report 
entitled Catatan Akhir Tahun 2017: 
Perampasan Tanah, Kekerasan dan 
Deforestasi (End of Year 2017: Land 
Grabbing, Violence and Deforesta-
tion in Papua [walhi Papua and 
others 2017]). The report identified 
the encroaching hands of mining 
corporations that secure new busi-
ness permits from the Ministry of 
the Environment. Four corporations 
operate in the Province of Papua: Wira 
Emas Persada Inc in Nabire (mineral 
exploration, 1,242 hectares); Aurum 
Wira Persada Inc in Nabire (mineral 
exploration, 13,880 hectares); Trident 
Global Garmindo Inc (mineral explo-
ration, 17,830 hectares); and  Madinah 
Qurrata’ain Inc in Dogiyai (gold 
exploration, 23,340 hectares); and 
two are in the West Papua Province, 
namely, Bayu  Khatulistiwa Sejahtera 
Inc in  Manokwari (gold exploration, 
7,741 hectares) and Dharma Nusa 
Persada Inc (gold exploration, 20,805 
hectares).
In total, the new permits will seize 
as much as 84,838 hectares (848.38 
square kilometers) of land  belonging 
to Indigenous communities. To put 
this in perspective, the amount of land 
to be seized is approximately half 
the size of the city of London (1,572 
square kilometers). If we imagine 
that half of London—had the city 
been arbitrarily occupied by a foreign 
entity—was suddenly lost, we can then 
also begin to imagine how this loss 
of gardens and herbs for daily life, 
rituals, playgrounds, hunting grounds, 
and other social spaces will impact 
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Papuans. Moreover, these business 
permits are only footnotes in the long 
list of the existing permits for the 
eighty-seven companies that currently 
occupy 2.1 million hectares (approxi-
mately 21,000 square kilometers) of 
Papua (Franky and Morgan 2015, 
59–62), or approximately 13 times the 
size of Greater London.
As we can expect, people were 
not silent. They resisted. The report 
documented six major protests across 
Papua against the  government deci-
sions that confiscated their land 
(walhi Papua and  others 2017). 
For instance, Masyarakat Adat 
 Independen (the Independent Forum 
of Indigenous Community) in Timika 
raised this issue to involve the Indig-
enous Papuans at the negotiating 
table between the Indonesian govern-
ment and Freeport Indonesia, while 
 Yeresiam Goa demanded that the 
Government of Papua revoke the 
business permit for mining companies 
in their land in Nabire. Similarly, in 
Manokwari, the Indigenous commu-
nity rejected a palm oil plantation, and 
in Merauke, Papuan students took 
to the street to ask the government 
to end the large-scale agribusiness 
mifee (Merauke Integrated Food and 
Energy Estate) project (Awas mifee 
2012). These grassroots protests are 
not new. Rather, the people are almost 
exhausted from raising their voices as, 
time after time, they reach a dead end. 
Local and national governments and 
other state bodies seem irresponsive 
to their concerns, while the people’s 
income sources and thus their sur-
vival are being devastated (icp 2017, 
135–140).
If we zoom out of this snapshot of 
life in Papua, we can see the conflict-
ing, often-incoherent narratives that 
offer a fragmented representation of 
reality for many Papuans. These gaps 
in representation are reflected by the 
disjuncture between the high-level 
politics that engage global policies and 
daily realities not adequately reflected 
in the same discourses. On the one 
hand, most observers and political 
actors put a strong emphasis on politi-
cal activism and state violence, even 
over attention to the daily struggles of 
Papuan women, health issues, extrac-
tive industries, and the land grabbing 
that will disadvantage many genera-
tions to come. On the other hand, 
the state’s narrative puts an equally 
strong emphasis on economic growth 
as measured by macro indicators. As 
a result, not only are these narratives 
at odds with each other but, more 
importantly, the narrow foci of both 
narratives obscure the daily realities 
and struggles of many Papuans.
Similarly, if we closely look at 
reports on Papua by Indonesian 
human rights organizations, the 
reports are largely event-based, mean-
ing that they apply the same logic to 
focus on individual occurrences and 
singular issues, rather than on the 
long-term patterns connecting those 
occurrences and issues. While the 
approach is adequate for issues related 
to civil and political rights, it fails to 
address the interconnections between 
economic, social, and cultural issues. 
The latter require different lenses to 
adequately capture the complex reality 
that involves long-term, dynamically 
changing issues. 
These fragmented, narrowly 
focused representations pose a formi-
dable challenge to those who follow 
the discourses about Papua, as they 
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have to navigate conflicting narra-
tives to develop a coherent picture of 
Papuan reality.
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Papua New Guinea
The year 2017 had the potential to 
bring great changes to the Independent 
State of Papua New Guinea. Much 
of the political news was dominated 
by stories regarding the general 
election and the discontinuation of 
Australia’s offshore refugee deten-
tion and  processing center, hosted on 
the island of Manus. Other notable 
events affecting the nation included 
changes in leaders outside of the 
election,  economic challenges, and 
the  conclusion of the long-standing 
controversy over the arrest warrant 
of Prime Minister Peter O’Neill. At 
the conclusion of a year that brought 
numerous changes, much has stayed 
the same.
The beginning of the year saw 
an early overturn of leadership as 
two knights having the same first 
name ended their time in leader-
ship.  Governor-General Sir Michael 
Ogio passed away in February after 
a long struggle with issues of health. 
Ogio was in the final week of his 
six-year term as the queen’s viceregal 
representative and, as his term was 
coming to a close, Parliament had 
already appointed Bob Dadae to fill 
the  position. Dadae had served as a 
member of Parliament (mp) for the 
Kabwum electorate in Morobe Prov-
ince for the previous fifteen years and 
assumed the role on 28 February. He 
was subsequently knighted in London. 
Dadae’s appointment could be seen as 
a reward of sorts for crossing the floor 
from the government led by then-
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Prime Minister Sir Michael Somare to 
the O’Neill-led opposition in 2011.
Although he initially indicated that 
he would step away from politics 
in 2012, Grand Chief Sir Michael 
Somare finalized his political legacy 
in April as he stepped away from 
a career that spanned more than 
fifty years in public service. Somare 
started as a teacher and government 
interpreter in the early 1960s before 
being elected to the House Assembly 
in 1968. He is noted for an unbroken 
span of forty-nine years in legislative 
service and is best remembered for 
serving as prime minister at the time 
of independence in 1975. Somare-led 
governments covered a total of seven-
teen years across three terms: 1975–
80, 1982–85, and 2002–11 (Johnstone 
2011). His departure comes after he 
was ignominiously removed from the 
prime minister’s role in 2011 while 
receiving medical treatment in Singa-
pore for an extended period of time. 
Somare was never quite able to regain 
his political stature after the constitu-
tional crisis that ensued, during which 
both Somare and O’Neill were recog-
nized as legitimate prime minister by 
various groups within government. 
The retirement of Sir Michael, the 
longest-serving politician by far, marks 
a changing of the guard in PNG poli-
tics as the country celebrated its 42nd 
anniversary of independence. Somare’s 
departure was met in Parliament 
with the stately fanfare that would 
be expected for a man that is often 
hailed as the “Father of the Nation.” 
After inspecting an honor guard, he 
was presented with songs, cultural 
dances, and speeches by leaders in 
the public and private sector (Zarriga 
2017). Not all were pleased with his 
retirement, though. Prior to retirement 
ceremonies, supporters of the depart-
ing governor for East Sepik Province 
turned up at the provincial assembly 
“to demand their payments for vari-
ous projects, activities and for their 
loyalty and unwavering support for 
Sir Michael during his distinguished 
political career” (Fito 2017).
The election cycle officially 
launched on 20 April, the first polling 
stations were to open on 26 July, and 
the writs were to be returned on or 
before 24 July. Campaigning for the 
111 parliamentary seats (89 members 
and 22 governors) was underway 
immediately in April, as parliamen-
tarians returned to their electorates 
to jockey for voters’ favor and party 
leaders retreated to their various 
camps to determine policies, entice 
defections, and calculate ways to gain 
numerical ascendency for the next 
five years.
This was a particularly polariz-
ing election as rhetoric was mostly 
directed for or against the incumbent 
government, led by Prime Minister 
O’Neill and the People’s National 
Congress (pnc). The pnc set up base 
in Alotau while their leading chal-
lengers, a coalition of the National 
Alliance Party and the historic Pangu 
Party, established a camp in Kokopo. 
The National Alliance and Pangu 
coalition sought the support of dis-
satisfied parliamentarians and found 
it in members of Triumph Heritage 
Empowerment Party, PNG Consti-
tutional Democratic Party, People’s 
Progress Party (ppp), PNG National 
Party, and other independents. This 
loose coalition became known as sim-
ply the Alliance. While policies among 
members varied, they all upheld the 
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explicit goal to replace the government 
led by O’Neill and the pnc (Blades 
2017).
Notable among these dissatisfied 
candidates was former Prime Minis-
ter Sir Mekere Morauta, a National 
Alliance member and staunch O’Neill 
critic, as well as Patrick Pruaitch and 
Don Polye, former cabinet members 
in O’Neill’s government. Standing to 
represent the Port Moresby North-
west electorate, Morauta came out 
of retirement as a result of several 
very public spats between himself and 
O’Neill. Morauta had levied a strong 
critique against the financial  policies 
and performance of the economy 
under pnc leadership, while O’Neill 
criticized Morauta’s management of 
the nonprofit PNG Sustainable Devel-
opment Program Limited. Pruaitch, 
member for Aitape-Lumi, joined the 
opposition after O’Neill relieved 
him of his portfolio in charge of the 
treasury in May, following Pruaitch’s 
announcement that the PNG economy 
had “fallen off a cliff” (emtv Online 
2017). Representing the Kandep 
electorate in Enga Province, Polye was 
also a former minister of the treasury 
for O’Neill and had been similarly 
dismissed in 2014 after criticizing the 
government’s decision and legality 
of methods used to secure a loan of 
3 billion kina (us$951 million) from 
the Union Bank of Switzerland (ubs) 
(Pokiton 2017).
The Alliance campaign strategies 
sought to undermine unpopular pnc 
policies. Kavieng mp Ben Micah, a ppp 
member, promised that as prime minis-
ter he would cancel the 2018 meetings 
of the Asia Pacific Economic Council 
(apec) in Port Moresby due to dam-
age of iconic Indigenous cultural sites 
caused by the construction of new 
buildings by foreigners (The National 
2017a). Similarly, Don Polye went 
so far as to promise the people of the 
Autonomous Region of Bougainville 
that, if elected, his government would 
recognize their independence (The 
National 2017b)—a refutation of the 
pnc’s stance that the 2019 referendum 
on independence would be nonbind-
ing (The Economist 2017). Mekere 
Morauta’s vocal opposition to Peter 
O’Neill also continued as Morauta 
called O’Neill out for not agreeing to 
public, televised debates (PNG Post-
Courier 2017).
The campaign period was mostly 
peaceful although there were instances 
of concern in some areas, including 
several deaths as violence erupted 
between crowds. Prime Minister 
O’Neill was not exempt from opposi-
tion, as a pnc rally he was attending 
in Hela Province was interrupted by 
a hostile crowd. O’Neill and the pnc 
also copped strong criticism from 
student activists at the University 
of Papua New Guinea (upng) for 
their use of the social media hashtag 
#pnc4png. The upng objectors 
claimed that this digital campaign 
slogan was an appropriation of their 
protest motto #upng4png (Kaiku 
2017), a movement that strongly 
criticized pnc government policies and 
was met with lethal force as police 
shot protestors attempting to march 
on Parliament House in June 2016. 
Despite these difficulties, pnc party 
candidates, including O’Neill, touted 
their many successes while in control 
of government, citing a 92 percent 
success rate in achieving goals outlined 
by the party in the Alotau Accord 
(Kenneth 2017a).
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A unique feature of this election 
was the scheduling of only a single day 
for casting votes at many polling sites. 
This was a first for elections in PNG 
and appeared to many familiar with 
elections in the country, including this 
author, to pose significant logistical 
challenges for both electoral officials 
and voters. Areas where the single-
day ballot were to be used included 
the seven provinces in the highlands, 
as well as those of East New Britain, 
Morobe, Madang, and Port Moresby’s 
National Capital District (Kenneth 
2017c). Indeed, the locations with 
one-day polling did come up against 
such barriers and, in most cases, 
polls were deferred at least once. In 
O’Neill’s Ialibu-Pangia electorate in 
the Southern Highlands province, 
polls were pushed back until Sunday, 
leading opponents to question the 
legitimacy and legality of a vote taking 
place on the day considered holy to 
most Christian denominations (Kero 
and Tien 2017). 
Other challenges manifesting them-
selves in the 2017 General Election 
included the distribution of insuffi-
cient ballot papers to polling locations 
at state-run tertiary learning institu-
tions; accusations of as many as three 
hundred thousand “ghost voters” (a 
claim denied by the Electoral Commis-
sion) (rnz 2017a); reports of double 
voting; and some instances of violence 
and intimidation, especially toward 
women, at balloting sites. Perhaps the 
largest challenge to the polling process 
was the high level of inaccuracy of the 
common roll of voters. Social media 
platforms were filled with accounts of 
voters being turned away from polling 
places. Many, like Steven Winduo, 
went from polling place to polling 
place looking for their names on the 
list after being turned away from the 
same station at which they had cast 
ballots for years. As a result, Winduo 
declared, “the 2017 general election 
in Port Moresby was indeed very 
disorganised, disruptive, and failed to 
live up to the expectation observed in 
previous general elections” (Winduo 
2017). This was not the first time that 
the common voting roll has been a 
barrier to a free and fair election, with 
previous observer groups expressing 
the need to update and maintain the 
rolls and the Electoral Commission’s 
several promises to do so. The need 
for these changes was highlighted 
again by the Commonwealth Observ-
ers’ Group, which declared that the 
body was “very disappointed” with 
the failure to improve the integrity of 
the rolls after previous recommenda-
tions (Pacific Islands Report 2017a) 
and led the group to reiterate the need 
to “review and strengthen the voter 
registration and electoral roll” in their 
final report (Commonwealth Observ-
ers Group 2017, 21).
In Port Moresby, an election work-
ers’ strike over nonpayment of wages 
further complicated the  balloting 
 process. Shortcomings of the roll, 
 election deferrals due to the unpre-
paredness of officials, and strikes not 
only inconvenienced voters but also 
cost employers. Many businesses 
allowed time off to their employees or 
even closed for the entire day to allow 
them to vote, resulting in loss of sales; 
one Port Moresby business claimed 
a net loss of some 200,000 kina 
(us$61,000) (Pacific Islands Report 
2017b).
In an election that pitted leaders 
mostly for or against the pnc and 
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its policies, researcher Michael Mell 
projected that only approximately 50 
percent of parliamentarians would 
be returned to their seats (Ovasuru 
2017). Predictions for a high turnover 
of serving politicians were correct, 
and many high-profile figures who 
could have been considered shoe-ins 
to win reelection were turned back by 
their constituencies. These included 
pnc strongman and Speaker Theo 
 Zurenuoc of Finschafen, who was 
replaced by Pangu’s Renbo Paita, 
the youngest parliamentarian of this 
session at thirty years of age. So dis-
traught were Zurenuoc supporters that 
the electoral returns officer felt the 
need to seek protective police custody 
(rnz 2017b). Both the opposition 
and the government lost seats belong-
ing to long-standing and prominent 
figures in Parliament. These included 
the aforementioned members of the 
Alliance ppp member Ben Micah of 
Kavieng and Don Polye from Kandep 
in Enga, as well as O’Neill’s Deputy 
Prime Minister Leo Dion of East New 
Britain. O’Neill used these results to 
deflect claims of vote rigging by oppo-
nents, stating that they proved that the 
elections were “a true reflection of the 
people’s choices” (Nalu 2017).
While much of the focus during the 
campaign period was on pnc policies 
and the removal or retention of that 
party and its leaders, the 2017 election 
was far from a two-horse race, with a 
total of twenty-one parties represented 
at the conclusion of the balloting. 
After the polls closed, Alliance leaders 
felt they might have the potential to 
garner the requisite numbers to form a 
government, but despite twenty of the 
writs not having been declared, Elec-
toral Commissioner Patilias Gamato 
invited the pnc to form a government. 
While the move was premature—and 
Alliance leaders duly protested—the 
pnc did eventually round out the 
numbers to form a government. Peter 
O’Neill was elected prime minister, 
sixty to forty-six. The pnc only gar-
nered a net total of twenty-nine seats, 
and the balance of the votes came 
from successful candidates belonging 
to other parties, such as Governor for 
the National Capital District Powes 
Parkop of the Social Democratic Party 
and Mt Hagen’s William Duma of the 
United Resources Party. The pnc also 
gained support from several candi-
dates who had campaigned on plat-
forms staunchly opposed to O’Neill’s 
policies. Many of them joined his 
headquarters at Alotau or crossed 
the floor shortly after the first sitting 
of Parliament in July. This number 
included Bulolo mp Sam Basil, the 
Pangu Party head and a strong figure 
in the Alliance who had vowed to take 
leadership away from O’Neill. Eleven 
Pangu Party members joined Basil 
in the defection. This included Chris 
Yer Nangoi of the Sumkar electorate 
and Moriape Kavori of Lufa, Eastern 
Highlands Province. Basil, Nangoi, 
and Kavori were each rewarded with 
roles in the prime minister’s cabinet 
as a result (Kero 2017). Although 
O’Neill’s pnc-led coalition govern-
ment has a clear majority this term, 
these results have also created a much 
stronger and possibly emboldened 
opposition for this term, which will 
clearly present challenges to the fur-
thering of current policies in a Parlia-
ment in which fluctuating allegiances 
are not uncommon.
While the electoral commission 
expected some 4,068 candidates to 
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stand for election, only 3,332 of them 
finalized their registration (Kenneth 
2017b). Of this number, 167 were 
women, with all provinces except 
West New Britain fielding at least one 
female candidate. Among the women 
to stand for election was Pangu Party 
candidate Dulciana Somare, the 
daughter of the previously mentioned 
Sir Michael Somare. While her father 
gave her his unconditional support 
and encouraged all voters to back 
female candidates, when the final 
results were read, none of the women 
had been elected to Parliament. The 
exclusion of female candidates could 
see a resurgence in calls for special 
seats for women, but this had not 
eventuated by the year’s end.
The process of manually tabulating 
ballots under the current Limited Pref-
erential Voting (lpv) system currently 
in place is a lengthy affair, one that 
was not helped by electoral worker 
strikes in some areas such as Port 
Moresby or by violence, seen in the 
provinces of Enga, Western Highlands, 
and Southern Highlands. Numerous 
disruptions to counting in the race for 
governor of the latter province delayed 
the final declaration of the victor, 
 William Powi of pnc, until Septem-
ber—well after Parliament had been 
seated. 
Unfortunately, several people died, 
many were injured, and property was 
damaged or destroyed as a result of 
election-related violence in various 
locales, most in disputes that occurred 
during the counting process. Exact fig-
ures of those killed or injured in elec-
tion or tabulation events are difficult 
to extrapolate. One anomaly to occur 
after the election proceedings had con-
cluded was the assassination of Jiwaka 
Regional candidate Fred Konga on 
25 August. Konga and associates 
were traveling along the Poreporena 
Freeway in Port Moresby when their 
vehicle was attacked by unknown 
assailants and Konga was executed. 
Deaths as a result of fights between 
candidate supporters are unfortunate 
but do occur with some regularity in 
Papua New Guinea;  however, assas-
sinations such as this are virtually 
unknown.
The logistical challenges of PNG 
elections are unenviable and require a 
great amount of effort and resources. 
While the election cycle of 2017 did 
see several instances of irregularities, 
violence, strikes, and even some out-
right corruption, to declare it a failure 
would elide the numerous successes 
of the thousands of election workers 
deployed to some 10,800 polling sta-
tions across the country. The efforts 
of these workers and the millions of 
peaceable voters should be applauded, 
but the glaring shortcomings of the 
voter rolls and registration process, 
nondelivery of ballots, bribery, and 
outright fraud similarly cannot be 
ignored. The Electoral Commission 
has once again promised to address 
shortcomings of the common roll 
going forward, but the problem has 
been noted by citizens, international 
and domestic observer groups, and 
even the Electoral Commission itself 
for years with no significant improve-
ment. Security concerns, particularly 
in montane regions, also necessitate 
upgrades in electoral planning for 
future ballots in order to preserve lives 
and ensure an atmosphere in which a 
truly free and fair election can occur. 
The inefficient methods of manual lpv 
counting are also in need of an update, 
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but such a change may prove  difficult, 
as many are suspicious of new tech-
nologies in such a critical setting and 
vote counters often enjoy financial 
rewards for their efforts. 
While the General Election cap-
tured headlines for the several months 
of its cycle, the refugee detention 
center on Manus has remained a 
controversial point in politics for 
several years. The detention center 
indirectly came into the international 
spotlight as dispute over the fate 
of refugees housed there led newly 
elected businessman-turned-politician 
Donald Trump, now the US president, 
to allegedly hang up the telephone on 
Australian Prime Minister  Malcolm 
Turnbull. The highly publicized phone 
call became heated after their discus-
sion turned to the deal signed by 
former President Barack Obama that 
would see asylum seekers given refuge 
in the United States. 
Declared unconstitutional and 
ordered to close by the PNG Supreme 
Court in 2015, the refugee detention 
was scheduled to close on 31 July. 
The site has been controversial both 
in Australia and Papua New Guinea 
since its inception, and the primary 
perception of it from both detainees 
and the general public was one of 
chaos and confusion. More than once 
during the year, Australian authorities 
offered large sums of money to asylum 
seekers who would agree to return to 
their respective points of origin or to 
resettle in Cambodia, Nauru, or Papua 
New Guinea. These efforts to reduce 
the total number of asylum seekers 
through agreed-to repatriation were 
coupled with the forced deportation 
of several individuals whose refugee 
status was rejected.
Acting as a voice for the detainees 
and communicating their plight to 
the world, Kurdish Iranian journalist 
Behrouz Boochani has been keep-
ing the international public abreast 
of the views of the asylum seekers. 
Boochani’s use of social media plat-
forms, especially WhatsApp, allowed 
him to partner with New York Times 
journalist Megan Specia in a power-
ful rebuttal of Trump’s initial decision 
to renege on the Obama-era deal to 
resettle in the United States 1,250 
refugees who had been seeking asylum 
in Australia. After calling the arrange-
ment “a dumb deal” in a Twitter post, 
the US president subsequently agreed 
to honor the plan (Specia 2017). 
In April, officials from the US 
Department of Homeland Security 
documented and interviewed the asy-
lum seekers, and by November about 
50 had been resettled in the United 
States. By the end of the year, some 
600 remained at the camp, despite 
its closure and inhumane conditions. 
Afraid to move to temporary housing 
in the provincial capital Lorengau, the 
detainees continued to hold out hope 
for resettlement in the United States or 
Australia (Goldman and Cave 2017). 
Eventually approximately 300 of the 
detainees were moved to the new site 
at East Lorengau, while 200 others 
were slated to be sent to the United 
States shortly. 
Confusion regarding the legal status 
of the refugees and the camp itself 
was not the only issue regarding the 
Manus detention center to rise to the 
fore. At least two riots erupted at the 
camp, ostensibly over the quality of 
food. The riots were not solely caused 
by the asylum seekers; in one instance, 
reports laid blame on Australian 
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guards (rnz 2017c). On a separate 
occasion, drunken officers from 
the PNG Defence Force rampaged 
through the facility. Detainees also 
complained of threats and intimida-
tion from locals and used social media 
outlets to release videos showing men, 
apparently drunk locals, issuing death 
threats in Tok Pisin (Palin 2017). 
Specific information about the status, 
affairs, and well-being of the would-be 
migrants is challenging to find. Exact 
numbers of those remaining at the 
new island encampment and informa-
tion about when they will be relocated 
and to which destinations are parts of 
the Manus saga that are still evolving. 
Early in the year a spat over inter-
national trade with Fiji did not help 
the country’s economic outlook as the 
Fijian government banned imports of 
certain PNG-made brands including 
bully beef, rice, and biscuits. The PNG 
trade minister at the time, Richard 
Maru, dubbed Fiji “a dishonourable 
country” and threatened to respond 
in kind. Fiji’s leadership indicated 
concerns over biosecurity issues, but 
Trade Minister Faiyaz Koya eventually 
reopened the free trade agreement that 
has governed the relationship since the 
1990s (rnz 2017d). 
For the third consecutive year, 
Papua New Guinea faced economic 
challenges, especially in comparison 
with the strong growth experienced 
since the beginning of the various 
projects to extract liquefied natural 
gas (lng) that produced noticeable 
shifts in the economy during their 
construction phases. The completion 
of these projects is one of the largest 
factors affecting the trend of slower 
growth, which is projected to be less 
than 3 percent (imf 2017). The lng 
slowdown has not been the only chal-
lenge to face the oil and gas industry, 
since oil production has declined as oil 
fields mature (Osborne, Harden, and 
Roy 2017). Challenges in the natural 
resource sector were matched by chal-
lenges from the natural environment 
as a severe drought has been affecting 
local agriculture. Said drought has 
also been a causal factor for the rise of 
local inflation over 6 percent. Despite 
these financial woes, the supple-
mentary budget filed by the O’Neill 
government in September seeks to 
reduce the fiscal debt but does so “on 
unchanged fiscal and monetary poli-
cies” (imf 2017).
Deputy Prime Minister and Min-
ister for Treasury Charles Abel has 
spoken boldly about the need for 
improvements to the financial man-
agement of the country. Whether 
his leadership is able to bring that 
about remains to be seen. This is 
especially salient as the economic 
boom that  correlated with the con-
struction phases of the lng project 
and the excitement surrounding the 
first shipments of the export also did 
not play out, as many had hoped, 
into improvement and real develop-
ment, especially for citizens in rural 
areas. Analysts at the Lowy Institute 
observed, “Papua New Guinea failed 
to achieve any of the Millennium 
Development Goals and it is cur-
rently ranked a lowly 154 out of 188 
countries on the UN Human Develop-
ment Index” (Osborne, Harden, and 
Roy 2017). Despite these challenges, 
Australian High Commissioner to 
PNG Bruce Davis voiced his country’s 
confidence in Papua New Guinea’s 
economic outlook, noting that “two-
way trade is worth around k14 bil-
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lion with about 64 percent of trade 
exported from Papua New Guinea to 
Australia” (Vari 2017).
Several government departments 
failed to pay rent or utility bills on 
time, leading to disruption of services. 
In February, Government House, Par-
liament House, Police Headquarters, 
and the main health center all had 
their power disconnected. The state-
owned power company PNG Power 
reported that the national govern-
ment owed them a combined total 
of over a$11 million across several 
departments at the end of 2016. In 
that same month, the United Nations 
suspended voting privileges for Papua 
New Guinea, as it had failed to pay 
annual dues. This came as a prison in 
Mt Hagen had food service disrupted 
because the contractor had not been 
paid, and New Zealand officials com-
plained of debts to contractors from 
their country (Tlozek 2017). In May, 
the government of the Autonomous 
Region of Bougainville threatened to 
take the PNG National Government 
to court, as they had not received over 
us$250 million in budgetary allow-
ances. The month of June saw staff at 
the PNG Embassy to the United States 
in Washington dc locked out due to 
nonpayment of rent, and several gov-
ernment offices in Port Moresby were 
similarly barred from facilities for the 
same reason in August.
Issues with infrastructure also 
raised the ire of the general public. 
Blackouts have always been com-
mon across Papua New Guinea, and 
these complaints were magnified as 
the Ramu power station experienced 
major disruptions in service that 
affected areas from Madang and Lae 
to the highlands. Meanwhile, newly 
built roads in Port Moresby became 
traffic hazards during times of rain as 
a result of floods caused by poor plan-
ning and construction. These problems 
arise as rural residents regularly point 
out the disparity between funds allo-
cated and projects underway in Port 
Moresby in comparison with their 
areas. Expenditures and construction 
in preparation for apec meetings in 
2018 have further exacerbated these 
concerns. Some previously criticized 
infrastructure proved beneficial this 
year as facilities built for the 2015 
Pacific Games were used to host three 
matches of the Rugby League World 
Cup. The national team, the PNG 
Kumuls, won all three of their matches 
at the National Football Stadium in 
Port Moresby, beating representative 
sides from Wales, Ireland, and the 
United States.
Issues with payment of debts and 
infrastructure may not be directly 
related to the country’s economic 
struggles, but such occurrences do not 
build confidence in the competence, 
vision, or efficiency of state bureau-
cracies and their respective leader-
ship, as well as the overall leadership 
of the state. The high turnover of 
parliamentary representatives at the 
2017 election may partially stem from 
both the persistence of such problems 
and politicians’ repeated promises to 
change them. 
Since its earliest days, the Indepen-
dent State of Papua New Guinea has 
allowed its citizens to maintain citizen-
ship in only one country. In 2016, this 
policy was reversed by constitutional 
amendments and the passage of the 
Citizenship Act. These changes were 
implemented in March and April of 
2017 as applications were opened to 
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people from eligible countries to apply 
for PNG citizenship. This was seen as 
good news by both the large PNG resi-
dent expatriate community and Papua 
New Guineans residing overseas. The 
group that likely benefits most from 
this change in policy, however, are the 
thousands of West Papuans who have 
been living in Papua New Guinea as 
refugees, some of whom have been 
in the country for as long as forty 
years. In April, 1,114 West Papuans 
residing at the East Awin camp near 
Kiunga were granted naturalization in 
two ceremonies in as many days (Sii 
2017). More than a hundred other 
West Papuans were reported to have 
received dual citizenship in Papua 
New Guinea in 2017. While several 
West Papuans had forfeited their offi-
cial status as  citizens of Indonesia over 
the years, the monetary cost required 
to complete the process was beyond 
the means of most of the refugees, 
most of whom still live in camps or 
settlements, many in rural areas. This 
makes the government’s decision to 
waive fees for the West Papuan com-
munity especially significant. 
The 2014 loan secured by the 
O’Neill government from the United 
Bank of Switzerland to buy shares 
in the natural resource exploration 
company Oil Search Ltd also received 
attention this year. The government’s 
decision to sell the shares in 2017 
at a considerable loss was nearly as 
unpopular as the choice to secure the 
loan. Attached to that controversy 
was the June 2014 arrest warrant 
on suspicion of corruption that 
was issued for Prime Minister Peter 
O’Neill. After years of legal battles 
and numerous court decisions and 
appeals, the long-standing contro-
versy surrounding the legality of that 
2014 arrest  warrant appears to have 
been settled in mid-December 2017, 
at least for now. Originally upheld 
by the Supreme Court, the warrant 
was deemed to be defective based on 
a technicality by a different panel of 
three justices of that same body. An 
in-depth analysis of this decision is 
justified due to concerns over previ-
ous rulings, the type of precedent set, 
arguments for ruling it defective, and 
the lack of opposition, but that is 
beyond the scope of this review. But it 
is notable that “the Court’s  ruling did 
not exonerate O’Neill of the allega-
tions of corruption. It only said that 
the warrant issued was defective, 
leaving the substantive allegations 
still open to scrutiny” (Kama 2017). 
It will not be surprising if this issue is 
raised again in the future. However, 
the government’s official disbanding 
of the anticorruption watchdog group 
Taskforce Sweep and the failure to 
introduce a new independent com-
mission leaves little room for effective 
investigation or prosecution of corrup-
tion, abuses of power, or misconduct 
at the highest levels. 
Besides the previously mentioned 
passing of Governor-General Sir 
Michael Ogio, the year 2017 also saw 
several important figures in the politi-
cal and business communities pass 
away. Notable deaths included those 
of Janet Sape (58), women’s advocate, 
businesswoman, former gubernato-
rial candidate for Port Moresby, and 
PNG netball representative; radio 
host and broadcast journalist Roger 
Hau‘ofa (73); Ezekiel Anisi mp for 
Ambunti-Dreikikir Open in East Sepik 
Province, who was the youngest-ever 
member of Parliament (29); PNG 
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flag designer Susan Karike Huhume 
(60); former Chief Migration Officer 
Mataio Rabura (63); former Electoral 
Commissioner Sir Andrew Trawen 
(61); and newspaper editor Rosalyn 
Albaniel Evara (41), likely a victim of 
gender-based violence. 
james stiefvater
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Solomon Islands
The year 2017 has been one of intense 
political maneuvering in Solomon 
Islands, which had impacts on the 
functionality of the state appara-
tus. This started with media reports 
early in the year, revealing that the 
country was experiencing cash flow 
problems due to financial mismanage-
ment (Aatai 2017a). It was alleged by 
former Prime Minister Gordon Darcy 
Lilo that the government’s reserve 
had been reduced within two years 
from si$1.5 billion to si$150 million 
(si$100 = us$12.63). As a result, the 
government had to borrow to pay its 
bills and settle other financial com-
mitments (sibc 2017b). Minister of 
Finance Snyder Rini assured the gen-
eral public that government finances 
were stable and under control. This 
was contrary to the government’s 
actual financial performance through-
out the year because the government 
continued to delay the payment of 
bills and meeting its financial com-
mitments. For example, the Solomon 
Islands Government (sig)–sponsored 
students studying inside the country at 
Solomon Islands National University 
and at regional tertiary institutions 
such as the University of the South 
Pacific continued to experience delays 
in the payment of their allowances 
(sfb 2017c; Abana 2017). The Solo-
mon Islands Broadcasting Corporation 
(sibc), the country’s national broad-
caster, took drastic measures to ensure 
that it continued to operate, despite 
the government’s cash flow problem 
(Runa 2017). 
Apart from the country’s financial 
situation, the decisions of the Demo-
cratic Coalition for Change Govern-
ment (dccg) on a number of political 
issues were questionable. One of the 
government’s decisions was to pur-
chase a fixed-term estate title held by 
Levers Solomon Limited and acquire 
20 percent shares in Russell Islands 
Plantation Estate Limited. The deci-
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sion to purchase the land was for the 
establishment of a bomb disposal 
training facility, a World War II 
memorial park, and a sporting facil-
ity. The agreement to settle the land 
purchase, signed in Brisbane between 
government officers and a Levers 
Solomon Limited representative, was 
questionable because there was no 
justification as to why the govern-
ment opted for an outright purchase 
of the land while under law it could 
reassume possession of the land for a 
public purpose (see section 142a, Land 
and Titles [Amendment] Act 2016). 
There was also no evidence of any 
due diligence checks being undertaken 
before the government signed the 
agreement to acquire the land and the 
20 percent shares (SS 2017a). 
Another issue was the undersea 
fiber optic cable project to provide 
faster and cheaper Internet connectiv-
ity (Kafo 2017). Initially, the Asian 
Development Bank approved a loan 
for the project but later withdrew 
it because of bidding irregularities 
(Solomon Times Online 2017b). 
However, in 2016, through the Min-
istry of Finance, the dccg created a 
private company, the Solomon Islands 
Submarine Cable Company (siscc), 
to implement the project. In Janu-
ary 2017, it announced that Huawei 
Marine would be contracted to carry 
out the fiber optic cable project work 
(Solomon Times Online 2017a). 
Huawei Marine signed a contract 
with siscc in July to do the project. 
Australia raised security concerns 
that Huawei might have links to the 
Chinese government and would not 
allow the company to run the cable 
from Sydney to Honiara (abc News 
2017). The dccg’s reaction was to 
consider an alternative strategy. There 
was also an allegation that Huawei 
had given monetary political dona-
tions to the prime minister and his 
senior ministers, but this was denied 
by the prime minister (sfb 2017b). 
Despite such denial, it was apparent 
that Minister of Finance Snyder Rini 
played a key role in shaping the com-
mercial arrangement. The creation of 
siscc as a commercial arm of gov-
ernment could be subject to political 
manipulation since its establishment 
was through the Ministry of Finance. 
An important event in 2017 was 
the exit of the Regional Assistance 
Mission to Solomon Islands (ramsi) 
on 30 June. The purpose of the ramsi 
intervention had been restoring law 
and order as well as state rebuilding 
through the strengthening of govern-
ment machinery. As pointed out by the 
ramsi coordinator, Quinton Devlin, 
ramsi’s purpose was not about creat-
ing a perfect state but rather restoring 
stability and assisting “in establishing 
institutions that the Solomon Islands 
can continue to develop themselves” 
(Wyeth 2017). Following ramsi’s 
withdrawal, Solomon Islands Prime 
Minister Manasseh Sogavare traveled 
to Canberra in August and signed 
a bilateral security agreement with 
Australian Prime Minister Malcolm 
Turnbull. The agreement provided for 
the rapid deployment of Australian 
security forces in the event of a civil 
conflict. This could only happen based 
on a request from Solomon Islands 
Government and subject to Australia’s 
acceptance of it. While this was a posi-
tive step, the immediate ratification of 
this agreement in the Solomon Islands 
context by the National Parliament 
was not possible because of the chal-
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lenge posed by the political instability 
that started to show during the month 
of August. The political instability 
was triggered following Prime Min-
ister Sogavare’s sacking of Minister 
of Infrastructure and Development 
Jimmy Lusibaea and Minister of 
Mines David Dei Pacha due to corrup-
tion allegations and the reshuffling of 
other ministers (rnz 2017d). 
Allegations of corruption against 
government officers and members of 
Parliament continued to be featured 
in the news media and discussed on 
social media in 2017. For example, 
Magistrate John Numapo highlighted 
the fact that “corruption was not only 
spreading through Solomon Islands 
society but it was also slowly eating 
away once highly prized and respected 
societal values” (rnz 2017a). Accord-
ing to Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index Report, 
Solomon Islands was ranked 72 out 
of 176 countries in 2016 in terms of 
perceived levels of public corruption 
(Transparency Solomon Islands 2016); 
in 2017 it was ranked 85 out of 180 
countries (Transparency International 
2017). Such statistics indicate that 
corruption is endemic and a huge 
problem that has negative impacts 
on governance structures and service 
delivery in all sectors. Operation Task 
Force Janus was launched in 2016 as 
a joint initiative between the Royal 
Solomon Islands Police and the Minis-
try of Finance and Treasury to address 
corruption within the government. It 
focused on investigating alleged cor-
rupt practices relating to the govern-
ment’s tendering and procurement 
process. This has led to a number 
of arrests including, in June, that of 
Minister for Provincial Government 
David Tome, who was charged for 
stealing money from his constituency 
(Buchanan 2017). Members have 
raised concerns in Parliament about 
Janus’s function and workings. Prime 
Minister Sogavare defended the work 
of Janus and reassured members 
“that the role of Taskforce Janus was 
simply to carry out investigations in 
 collaboration with the Director of 
Public Prosecution” (rnz 2017c). 
Prime Minister Sogavare urged 
members of Parliament to consider 
Solomon Islands’ poor rating on cor-
ruption as a challenge to encourage 
them to be champions in the fight 
against corruption (sibc 2017e). He 
emphasized that “this is a commit-
ment—a crusade—the dcc Govern-
ment had pledged to pursue and we 
will deliver on it as we have promised 
in our manifesto” (sibc 2017a). 
While the dccg’s plan to fight against 
corruption was an important policy, 
it was a challenge getting members 
of Parliament to support proposed 
legal instruments such as the Anti-
Corruption Bill (acb); the Integrity 
Whistle Blower Bill; the Ombudsman 
(Special Provisions) Bill; the Leader-
ship Code (Further Provisions) Bill; 
the National and Provincial Election 
(Further Provisions) Bill; and the Free-
dom of Information Bill (Transparency 
Solomon Islands, 11 Jan 2016). The 
acb was withdrawn from Parliament 
in May 2016 due to lack of support 
from members (rnz 2016). During the 
United Nations Convention against 
Corruption (uncac) Resumed 7th 
Session of the Implementation Review 
Group (irg) in November 2016, the 
deputy secretary to the prime min-
ister, Derek Futaiasi, stated that the 
“Anti-Corruption Bill, Whistleblower 
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Protection Bill and Leadership Code 
Bill [were] all ready to go for enact-
ment by Parliament in March 2017” 
(Futaiasi 2016). Such a time frame 
was overambitious because the politi-
cal situation on the ground was not 
conducive to ensuring that the acb 
would be enacted. Most parliamen-
tarians of the dccg as well as the 
opposition and independent groups 
were unwilling to support the bill due 
to fear of being prosecuted. 
In August 2017, Prime Minister 
Sogavare made a motion on the floor 
of Parliament to withdraw the Anti-
Corruption Bill for the second time. 
The leader of opposition, the Honor-
able Jeremiah Manele, and the leader 
of the independent group, the Honor-
able Dr Derick Sikua, objected. Dr 
Sikua suggested that withdrawal of 
the bill was not in the interest of good 
governance (National Parliament of 
Solomon Islands 2017). The prime 
minister, however, strongly rebutted 
the objections, stressing that the acb 
required further amendments based on 
recommendations from the Bills and 
Legislation Committee. He pledged 
to bring back to Parliament a revised 
version of the bill during its next sit-
ting (rnz 2017e). Sogavare’s decision 
triggered widespread criticism. Civil 
society groups rallied public support 
to protest the prime minister’s deci-
sion. A petition signed by more than 
four thousand people asked the dccg 
to bring the acb back to Parliament. 
This was delivered to Acting Prime 
Minister Manasseh Maelanga, who 
promised that the dccg would pass 
the acb during Parliament’s next sit-
ting. Despite such assurance from the 
government, there was no guarantee 
that the bill would be enacted by Par-
liament due to continuing political dif-
ferences. During the months of August 
and September, there were already 
signs of differences between the 
political parties (Kadere Party, United 
Democratic Party [udp], and Peoples 
Alliance Party [pap]) that make up the 
dccg. Kadere and the udp are the 
two major coalition partners in the 
dccg. 
While enacting the Anti-Corruption 
Bill was one of the issues about which 
members of Parliament could not 
reach a consensus, perhaps the most 
central issue that stirred a rift among 
the political parties was the decision 
by the prime minister to fire three of 
his ministers and reshuffle nine minis-
terial portfolios in August. According 
to the Office of the Prime Minister, the 
reshuffle was necessary to “enhance 
the administration of Ministries that 
have been underperforming and 
improve efficiency to support the 
implementation and delivery of key 
policy objectives by the dccg” (sfb 
2017a). Although the reshuffling exer-
cise appeared to be well intentioned, 
it was a challenge getting the udp to 
support it. The udp opposed Soga-
vare’s proposal to reshuffle Minister 
of Finance and Treasury Snyder Rini 
and Minister of Fisheries and Marine 
Resources John Maneniaru. Rini is a 
member of the udp, and Maneniaru 
is a member of Kadere. The udp 
expressed the view that Sogavare’s 
plan to move Rini to the Ministry of 
Fisheries was nonnegotiable. This was 
because, prior to the formation of the 
dccg as a coalition, one of the deals 
with the udp was that Rini would get 
the finance minister portfolio, while 
Sogavare, who contested the 2014 
election as an independent candidate, 
political reviews • melanesia 535
would become the party’s wing leader 
in order to be eligible for the prime 
minister’s post. What this demon-
strates is that after every election 
cycle, governments in Solomon Islands 
are formed out of loose coalitions of 
individual members with highly per-
sonalized political motivations rather 
than being grounded in discrete and 
disciplined political parties with com-
mon political principles and policies.
Prime Minister Sogavare, however, 
reshuffled Rini and Maneniaru in 
mid-October (SS, 2017c). Although 
it seemed that the udp submitted to 
Sogavare’s decision, the move pro-
vided the impetus for further politi-
cal instability. The test of Sogavare’s 
political power transpired at the end 
of October 2017. This happened when 
nine ministers along with government 
backbenchers resigned. The minis-
ters who resigned included Deputy 
Prime Minister and Minister for 
Home Affairs Manasseh Maelanga, 
Minister for National Planning and 
Aid Coordination Danny Philip, and 
Minister for Fisheries and Marine 
Resources Snyder Rini (Pacific Media 
Watch 2017b). These ministers had 
been very influential in the Sogavare 
administration. They explained that 
their resignation was because of Soga-
vare’s leadership style. According to 
Mealanga, “The Prime Minister seems 
to be listening to certain Ministers 
and outsiders in his decision-making 
instead of consulting all Cabinet 
Ministers and all three Coalition 
partners in the Democratic Coalition 
for Change Government” (Oso 2017). 
In a press conference on 30 October 
2017, members of the opposition and 
independent groups sat together with 
members who had resigned from the 
dccg in a clear show of solidarity and 
unity. They publicly announced their 
newly formed allegiance and filed a 
motion of no confidence against Prime 
Minister Sogavare. This political situ-
ation shows that political parties have 
no strong and direct influence on their 
elected representatives.
There had been a coalition agree-
ment between the udp, Kadere, and 
the pap to form the dccg in 2014, but 
it had limited impact on the behaviors 
of members of Parliament. The resig-
nation of ministers and government 
backbenchers showed that members 
switched allegiance purely by reason 
of personal interest and personal 
choice. This reflects a weakness of the 
Political Party Integrity Act of 2014, 
which was enacted to regulate the 
operation of political parties. There is 
no punitive provision under the act to 
regulate instances in which members 
switch party allegiance or to restrict 
members’ crossing the floor. As a 
result, political instability continues to 
be a normal feature of governance in 
2017. It was apparent that the dccg 
no longer had the numerical strength 
to remain in office. However, about 
two days after the mass resignation, 
eight new ministers were sworn in, 
in an attempt to consolidate power. 
Two of these new ministers initially 
resigned and later rejoined the dccg. 
Such political maneuvering, often 
referred to as grasshopper politics, 
contributes to why it is difficult to 
monitor the political behavior, prefer-
ences, and sympathies of members of 
Parliament. Members are commonly 
found to contradict themselves either 
by making statements on which they 
later go back, by supporting a political 
view that they previously opposed, or 
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by switching sides in Parliament, con-
trary to their own expressed political 
principles.
What followed was a week of 
intense political rhetoric between the 
dccg and the opposition over who 
had the numbers to run the govern-
ment. Sogavare was unwilling to 
consider any calls to surrender and 
step down. Both the opposition and 
the dccg continued to claim “major-
ity support,” although it was obvious 
that one group had more members 
than the other. Despite the obvious 
tipping of government numbers, the 
prime minister remained defiant in 
the face of a clearly strengthened 
opposition group. In an attempt to 
get public support and to discredit the 
intentions of the defectors, the Office 
of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 
released a press statement asserting 
that the mass resignation by ministers 
had been an attempt to disrupt the 
revised Anti-Corruption Bill that was 
ready to be brought back to Parlia-
ment (SS 2017b). The office further 
stated, “Some of these resignations 
come as no surprise [because] some of 
these same Ministers were responsible 
for undermining the progress of the 
acb” (sibc 2017d). But Maelanga, 
who resigned as deputy prime minis-
ter, responded by stating that minis-
ters and government backbenchers 
“resigned based on individual grounds 
and personal convictions” (sibc 
2017d). They no longer had trust 
and confidence in the prime minister. 
While the reasons for resignation as 
revealed by Maelanga seemed genuine 
(despite the fact that it took a very 
long time for these individuals to 
arrive at this judgment), they were not 
enough to guarantee that the defectors 
from the dccg, the opposition, and 
independent groups would form the 
next government. 
Dr Derek Sikua made a motion 
of no confidence against the prime 
minister on 6 November. As to some 
of the issues why members of Parlia-
ment had no trust and confidence in 
the prime minister, he outlined the 
controversial Nazar Gold and Skyline 
Company deal, the prime minister’s 
text  message to mining investors, and 
the employment of the prime minis-
ter’s nephew as chief of staff in the 
Office of the Prime Minister and Cabi-
net. In response, Sogavare expressed 
his view that “reasons for the defected 
Members of Parliament (mps) who 
regrouped with the opposition bench 
to oust him were rooted from cor-
ruption” (Aatai 2017b). He alleged 
that former Finance Minister Snyder 
Rini and former Minister for Devel-
opment Aid Planning Danny Philip 
“were involved in some dirty dealings 
to rip-off government coffers” (Aatai 
2017b). He also revealed corruption 
regarding the allocation of shipping 
grants; some members of Parliament 
had applied for such funds for per-
sonal gain (Aatai 2017b). The issues 
raised by both Sikua and Sogavare 
were important indicators of the cor-
ruption and quality of governance at 
the national level, which ultimately led 
to the removal of Sogavare as prime 
minister following a successful vote 
of no confidence. The vote followed 
almost nine hours of heated debate 
during which members of Parlia-
ment from both the government and 
opposition groups made allegations 
of corruption against one another (see 
rnz 2017b). 
Two political groupings were 
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formed after the removal of Sogavare 
as prime minister. One group was 
the Heritage Park camp, compris-
ing Kadere and the People’s  Alliance 
Party, which were part of the for-
mer dccg. The other group was the 
Honiara Hotel camp, comprising 
the Democratic Alliance Party (dap) 
and the Solomon Islands People First 
Party (sipfp), who were the original 
opposition group, as well as defector 
parliamentarians of the dccg and the 
independent group. Not long after the 
formation of these groups, the dap 
and the sipfp switched to join the 
Heritage Park Hotel camp. mp Rick 
Houenipwela, speaking on behalf of 
the dap, explained that they moved 
from the opposition due “to a lack of 
consultation over a proposed cabinet 
line-up”; as a result of the switch, 
the Heritage Park camp increased 
its numbers from 23 to 30 (Pacific 
Media Watch 2017a). Houenipwela 
was nominated as their candidate. 
The opposition, now comprising the 
defected members of Parliament and 
the independent group, nominated 
John Moffat Fugui as their candidate. 
The election for a new prime minister 
was held on 15 November. Houenip-
wela became the new prime minis-
ter with a total of 33 votes, which 
brought back into power the former 
dccg but under a new coalition name, 
Solomon Islands Democratic Coalition 
for Change government (sidccg). The 
key objectives of sidccg would be “to 
maintain political stability, rectify the 
country’s fiscal situation and stamp 
out corruption” (sibc 2017c). While 
the new government provides hope for 
positive change, it is still too early to 
comment on whether the leadership of 
Houenipwela will effectively address 
its objectives as Solomon Islands 
moves from 2017 into 2018. 
joseph daniel foukona
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Timor-Leste
The year 2017 in Timor-Leste was 
dominated by a round of national 
elections and a major breakthrough 
in the country’s long-running dispute 
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with Australia over maritime bound-
aries. In the latter part of the year, a 
newly installed fretilin-led minority 
government proved unable to pass its 
program in Parliament, which saw the 
country head back to the polls in May 
2018. (fretilin is the acronym for 
one of Timor-Leste’s major political 
parties: the Revolutionary Front for an 
Independent East Timor.) A new mari-
time boundary and revenue-sharing 
treaty with Australia negotiated over 
2017 was signed in early March 2018. 
The year started unexpectedly 
with a joint announcement that the 
government of Timor-Leste would 
terminate the 2006 Treaty on Certain 
Maritime Arrangements in the Timor 
Sea (cmats) with Australia (Austra-
lian Treaty Series 2007). The deci-
sion, which Australia did not contest, 
opened the way for progress in bound-
ary negotiations. Aside from sharing 
the proceeds of undersea resources, 
the key feature of cmats was a 
fifty-year moratorium on boundary 
negotiations in favor of a series of 
revenue-sharing agreements, known 
as “provisional arrangements” under 
the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, or unclos. 
Having vigorously defended cmats 
as recently as 2016, several factors 
explain the change in Australia’s 
position. The 2006 treaty had been 
tarnished by allegations that Australia 
had spied on the East Timorese negoti-
ating team in 2004 (Smh 2013). Timor-
Leste had then challenged the treaty, 
invoking the Vienna Convention’s 
principle that negotiations should 
take place in “good faith.” Equally 
significantly, in April 2016 the govern-
ment of Timor-Leste initiated compul-
sory conciliation proceedings under 
unclos with the aim of concluding 
permanent maritime boundaries with 
Australia. Australia’s opening legal 
gambit—a jurisdictional claim that the 
cmats treaty had already settled the 
border dispute—was dismissed by the 
conciliation commission in September 
2016, which found that Australia’s 
obligation to settle the boundary 
survived the treaty and its purported 
moratorium (unclos Conciliation 
Commission 2016). Having lost this 
argument, Australia had little further 
practical use for cmats. An additional 
factor was the dispute between China 
and its neighbors in the South China 
Sea, which raised the regional pro-
file of international law in boundary 
disputes. In that case, Australia urged 
China to follow the rule of law, as rep-
resented by the decision of the tribunal 
formed under unclos. The contrast 
with Canberra’s own behavior—its 
refusal to discuss a boundary in the 
Timor Sea and its withdrawal from 
the dispute-settlement provisions of 
unclos shortly before East Timorese 
independence in 2002—had created 
a public relations problem for Aus-
tralia. For example, the powerful US 
House Armed Services Committee’s 
National Defense Authorization Act 
for 2018 was specifically amended to 
encourage resolution of the maritime-
boundary dispute between Australia 
and Timor-Leste. The committee noted 
that negotiations would send “a posi-
tive signal to other states in the region 
regarding adherence to a rules-based 
international order,” highlighting the 
“potential security benefits” likely to 
flow from a peaceful resolution of the 
dispute (US House Armed Services 
Committee 2017, 2). There is little 
question that this shift in Washington 
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signaled extra pressure on Canberra to 
resolve the matter within the unclos 
conciliation process. These negotia-
tions reached a partial conclusion in 
September 2017, discussed later in 
this review.
The 2017 round of elections 
occurred in the wake of a government 
formed in extraordinary circumstances 
in early 2015, when the former inde-
pendence movement leader Xanana 
Gusmão handed over the prime min-
istership to an opposition fretilin 
figure, Rui Araújo. Though best seen 
as a power-sharing executive rather 
than a formal government of national 
unity, this informal “grand coalition” 
between Timor-Leste’s two largest 
parties—the National Congress for 
Timorese Reconstruction (cnrt) and 
fretilin—was a remarkable develop-
ment, given the bitter tensions between 
the parties as recently as 2012. 
Described by a senior cnrt minister as 
a transition from “belligerent democ-
racy to consensus democracy” (Pereira 
2014), this powerful combination 
left President José Maria Vasconcelos 
(better known by his nom de guerre, 
Taur Matan Ruak) as the closest thing 
to an effective opposition. Ruak did 
not shrink from this role, attacking the 
government over accountability issues 
in early 2016 (Allard 2016) and veto-
ing the initial version of its budget. 
His new party, the Partidu Libertasaun 
Popular (Popular Liberation Party, or 
plp), entered the fray in 2017.
The presidential campaign cul-
minated in a national vote on 20 
March. Despite the nomination of 
eight candidates, fretilin’s candi-
date, Francisco “Lú Olo” Guterres 
(a former guerrilla commander and 
twenty-four-year  veteran of the Falintil 
military resistance), received a massive 
boost in January 2017 with a previ-
ously unthinkable endorsement by 
Xanana Gusmão. While expressed as a 
personal opinion rather than a formal 
cnrt position, Gusmão’s authority 
was such that the party did not for-
mally support another candidate. This 
led many observers to conclude that 
the era of national unity would likely 
continue. Lú Olo was running for the 
third time after twice being runner-up 
(to José Ramos-Horta in 2007 and 
Ruak in 2012). 
The March 2017 presidential elec-
tion duly delivered a decisive victory 
for Guterres, receiving just over 57 
percent of the national vote, ahead 
of the Democratic Party’s António da 
Conceição (who was also endorsed by 
Ruak’s plp) with 32.5 percent. The 
clear majority in the first round meant 
a run-off election was not required 
for the first time since 2002. While 
the president has an important role 
in the formation of a government and 
holds a partial veto over legislation, 
executive power lies overwhelmingly 
with the prime minister and cabinet 
in Timor-Leste’s semi-presidential 
system, making the July parliamentary 
elections the more important of the 
two votes. 
Twenty-one parties contested sixty-
five seats in national parliamentary 
elections on 22 July. In a popula-
tion with a median age of just under 
nineteen years and a voting age of 
seventeen, this election represented 
an important transitional moment 
for Timor-Leste, with a full one-fifth 
of Timor-Leste’s 750,000 registered 
 voters participating for the first time. 
Under Timor-Leste’s closed-list pro-
portional system, voters select a party 
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rather than individual candidates. 
Each party registers a list of sixty-five 
candidates in order of election, giving 
party leaders substantial power over 
candidates anxious to appear high 
on the list. The system also allows 
for progressive features, such as the 
requirement that every third candidate 
be a woman, which has given Timor-
Leste one of the highest percentages 
of female members in Parliament in 
Asia, at 38 percent.
In 2017, parties needed at least 4 
percent of the vote to receive seats, 
up from 3 percent in 2012. While this 
hurdle modifies the strict proportion-
ality of the system, the large number 
of parties participating in the election 
attests to the relative ease of party 
registration and political participation. 
This reflects Timor-Leste’s relatively 
open society and pluralist culture, 
which saw it ranked as the most 
democratic country in Southeast Asia 
in the Economist’s 2016 Democracy 
Index (The Economist 2017) and saw 
the 2018 Freedom House “Freedom 
in the World” index increase Timor-
Leste’s ranking from “partly free” 
to “free” (Freedom House 2018).
Seeking to challenge the major 
parties, the immediate past Presi-
dent Taur Matan Ruak and his 
new plp campaigned strongly 
against the “megaproject”-led 
development  policies favored by 
the  previous  government, arguing 
instead for increased spending on 
basic  development indicators like 
 education, health, and agriculture. 
The plp vocally opposed the unpopu-
lar life pensions for  politicians and 
also raised allegations of patrimo-
nialism and the growth of “money 
politics” in  awarding government 
contracts. 
In many ways this set the party 
against the cnrt, which continued 
to campaign on rapid modernization 
through government-led infrastructure 
spending, embodied in Gusmão’s own 
strategic national development plan 
(Government of Timor-Leste 2011). 
For its part, fretilin’s parliamentary 
campaign slogan “For a more devel-
oped Timor-Leste” promised improved 
outcomes in education and health, 
using images of East Timorese making 
“plus” signs with crossed fingers. 
Despite the absence of its most 
senior Falintil military veteran, Lú 
Olo, this focus on development poli-
cies paid dividends and saw fretilin 
maintain its 2012 vote share in a 
more competitive field. In the 22 July 
election, fretilin emerged narrowly 
ahead of cnrt with 29.7 percent and 
29.5 percent respectively, resulting in a 
slim but important lead of 23 freti-
lin seats to cnrt’s 22. For its part, 
the cnrt vote dropped from 37 per-
cent in 2012, affected by the rise of the 
plp, which performed very creditably 
in its first outing with 10.6 percent 
of the national vote. This outcome 
marked the plp as the new third force 
in Timor-Leste’s politics and translated 
into 8 seats. The Democratic Party 
vote remained strong, with a share 
of 9.8 percent and 7 seats, despite 
the death of their founder Fernando 
“Lasama” de Araújo in 2015. Of par-
ticular interest was the rise of Kmanek 
Haburas  Unidade Nacional Timor 
Oan (khunto), with 6.4 percent of 
the vote. This party pitched its cam-
paign at Timor-Leste’s unemployed 
and disaffected youth and performed 
especially well in the rural areas, 
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doubling its 2012 vote to receive 5 
seats (Aspinall and Scambary 2017). 
The rise of both the plp and khunto 
suggested shifting voter alignments as 
Timor-Leste’s demographic “youth 
bulge” enters political life.
Having lost eight seats since 2012, 
Xanana Gusmão was openly disap-
pointed with the result and dramati-
cally announced his resignation as 
president of cnrt, declaring that the 
party would go into opposition. This 
announcement challenged a wide-
spread assumption that the power-
sharing arrangement between the 
two major parties would continue. 
The cnrt congress soon suspended 
Gusmão’s resignation, meaning that 
he remained party leader. Significantly, 
however, Gusmão ruled out leading an 
alliance of smaller parties, saying the 
cnrt “will not accept proposals from 
anyone, nor invite any party to form 
a coalition because it does not intend 
to participate in government” (Mur-
doch 2017). 
In combination with a fretilin 
president, fretilin’s narrow seat 
advantage gave the party an edge 
in the formation of a government. 
As no party had a majority of 33 
seats, fretilin attempted to form a 
coalition with the plp. Negotiations 
faltered on the choice of president of 
the national Parliament, a position 
approximating the speaker. The plp 
was also concerned by fretilin’s 
determination to include representa-
tives from other parties in the govern-
ment before a parliamentary majority 
alliance had been consolidated.
Surprisingly, a new majority coali-
tion then emerged with the Demo-
cratic Party—with whom fretilin 
has a fractious history—and khunto, 
only for the latter to exit at the last 
minute before a coalition-signing 
ceremony. This short-lived coalition 
nonetheless survived long enough to 
see fretilin’s Aniceto Guterres Lopes 
elected as president of the Parliament.
Ultimately, fretilin could only 
form a thirty-seat minority coalition 
with the Democratic Party. On 15 
September, with no alternative major-
ity coalition being proposed, President 
Guterres appointed the first minority 
government in Timor-Leste’s short 
constitutional history, with fretilin 
leader Mari Alkatiri as the new prime 
minister of Timor-Leste. The executive 
was bolstered by some well-regarded 
independents, including José Ramos-
Horta, and a scattering of ministers 
affiliated with other parties. Several 
plp members joined the new govern-
ment in ministerial roles, only to have 
their party membership suspended.
No opposition majority alliance 
was proposed at this point. However, 
events moved rapidly and quickly 
showed that the cnrt, the plp, and 
khunto were able to work together, 
sidelining most fretilin nominees in 
the formation of various parliamen-
tary committees. Subsequently, on 12 
October, these three parties formed 
the Parliamentary Majority Alliance 
(amp), controlling thirty-five seats. 
A political standoff emerged on 19 
October when the amp parties rejected 
the government’s program. To some 
extent, the standoff was a clash of 
emerging conventions in Timor-Leste’s 
democracy. Similar political systems 
tend to have a default presumption 
that the most-voted party will lead 
a coalition government. In Portugal, 
for example, that convention stayed 
in place for thirty-nine years after the 
544 the contemporary pacific • 30:2 (2018)
restoration of democracy in 1976. 
While this view was central to the 
government’s case, and minority gov-
ernments are perfectly constitutional, 
majority support in Parliament is still 
required to pass the program. Indeed, 
Portugal’s thirty-nine-year run ended 
in 2015 in similar circumstances. 
Importantly, Timor-Leste is of course 
entitled to develop its own political 
conventions, and these are still emerg-
ing, within the bounds of the constitu-
tion, through presidential practice. In 
one view, the convention might best be 
seen as first right to attempt to form 
a government, which fretilin was 
given. It is also notable that a cnrt-
led coalition had been installed in 
2007 led by the second-largest party, 
suggesting a new path for the conven-
tion in Timor-Leste.
While the amp did not question 
the constitutionality of the presi-
dent’s actions, it did refer to them as 
 “imprudent,” pointing to the politi-
cal unsustainability of the minority 
government and offering the amp 
as an alternative if the government 
fell (Leach 2018). It was then widely 
assumed that the government had 
thirty days to  resubmit the program 
and would fall if rejected a second 
time. However, the standoff revealed 
some grey constitutional areas, with a 
resubmission time limit unspecified in 
the constitution, though some com-
mentators argued that the thirty-day 
limit for the first  presentation was 
implied for the second (Feijó 2017). 
With the major parties at loggerheads, 
civil society was concerned that con-
flicting constitutional interpretations 
would revive memories of the 2006 
crisis and called for the parties to 
work together to establish a consen-
sus for political stability (Fundasaun 
Mahein 2017).
In December, the fretilin-led 
minority government failed to pass a 
budget rectification measure needed 
to fund new ministries and programs, 
and the state operated instead on 
a “duodecimal” system based on 
monthly allocation of the previous 
year’s budget. This period also saw 
the fretilin parliamentary president 
repeatedly delay opposition motions 
of no confidence and refer a motion 
for his own removal to the courts. 
Parliament also failed to hold cer-
tain plenary sessions in December, in 
breach of its own regulations. These 
tactics by the fretilin president of 
Parliament seemed designed to delay 
the second rejection of the government 
program until a time closer to 22 Jan-
uary, the earliest day the president 
could dissolve Parliament and call 
early elections. 
Gusmão’s lengthy absence through-
out this period (jokingly referred to 
by fretilin as a peregrinação, or 
pilgrimage) was largely necessitated 
by the intense maritime boundary 
negotiations with Australia and com-
mercial joint-venture partners. His 
controversial decision not to return 
during various breaks in the talks was 
portrayed by supporters as  “leaving 
it to a younger generation” but in 
practice tended to highlight how 
central he remained to any political 
resolution. Inflammatory rhetoric also 
increased, with Prime Minister Mari 
Alkatiri claiming that the rejection of 
the government program represented 
an attempted golpe, or coup. The 
opposition boycotted sittings of the 
parliamentary committee on budget 
and finances, effectively preventing 
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its operation, and called for the prime 
minister to step down. These develop-
ments further highlight the apparent 
return of “belligerent democracy” 
after the informal power-sharing 
 government of cnrt and fretilin 
from 2015 to 2017. 
With these parliamentary maneu-
vers nearing their end, President 
“Lú Olo” Guterres was critical to 
a resolution. With precedent from 
similar semi-presidential regimes in 
the Lusophone (Portuguese-speaking) 
world suggesting a wide constitu-
tional discretion, Guterres had the 
primary options of dissolving Parlia-
ment and seeking fresh elections (the 
path favored by fretilin) or seeking 
a solution within the current Parlia-
ment and installing an amp coalition 
government. On 25 January 2018, 
President Guterres announced a new 
election would take place, with a date 
of 12 May confirmed a week later. In 
the meantime, the fretilin–Demo-
cratic Party executive would act as a 
caretaker government.
The amp parties subsequently 
established a formal preelection 
coalition for the forthcoming elec-
tions, which would clearly make it a 
formidable force, greatly increasing 
its chances of finishing first. Another 
important development is the recent 
emergence of the Democratic Devel-
opment Front, or fdd—a group of 
smaller parties unable to clear the 
4 percent hurdle in 2017—with the 
stated aim of supporting the amp. 
Balancing this, Catholic Church com-
mentary on the minority government 
was relatively positive, a major shift 
from the 2005–2007 era. 
Despite the political ructions, East 
Timorese society remained largely 
calm. Leaving aside the return of a 
more belligerent form of democracy, 
and accusations of an institutional 
“coup,” the political standoff demon-
strated that the checks and balances in 
the constitutional system were operat-
ing, with strong executive accountabil-
ity to Parliament, previously lacking 
under the power-sharing government. 
Following twelve months of nego-
tiations that saw “confidence-building 
measures” enacted—including the 
termination of cmats and Timor-
Leste’s cessation of a separate legal 
action relating to espionage (Evering-
ham 2017)—Timor-Leste and Austra-
lia made a major joint announcement 
on 1 September (Permanent Court 
of Arbitration 2017), declaring they 
had reached an agreement on “cen-
tral aspects” of a maritime-boundary 
determination.
While full details remained 
confidential until 6 March 2018, 
the agreement created permanent 
maritime boundaries and revised 
resource-sharing arrangements in the 
yet-to-be-developed Greater Sunrise 
oil and gas field. This was a major 
step forward for the resolution of the 
long-running dispute between the two 
neighbors. Specifically, Timor-Leste 
secured a median-line boundary in 
the Timor Gap, creating a permanent 
maritime boundary for the first time. 
The median-line boundary places 100 
percent of the Joint Petroleum Devel-
opment Area (jdpa) in Timor-Leste’s 
sovereign waters, where prior trea-
ties divided the revenue from exist-
ing fields, such as Bayu-Undan, 90 
to 10 in its favor. However, as these 
fields are nearing the end of their 
life, far more financially significant 
is the renegotiated revenue split over 
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as-yet-untapped Greater Sunrise field, 
worth in excess of us$40 billion, 
including total potential revenues to 
the two governments in the order of 
us$12–15 billion. While Timor-Leste 
had a respectable legal opinion sug-
gesting that the entire Greater Sunrise 
field could be within its maritime 
waters under unclos, this claim was 
always a more complicated proposi-
tion, as the field straddles the eastern 
lateral (or side) boundary of the jdpa. 
Unlike the relatively straightforward 
median-line principles governing the 
east-west boundary, the north-south 
laterals involve complex techni-
cal considerations, with competing 
options for baselines and offsets. 
As the now defunct cmats treaty 
had given Timor-Leste a 50 percent 
share, renegotiation was a high-
stakes gamble, with the young state’s 
guaranteed share of Greater Sunrise 
revenues reverting to 20 percent under 
an  earlier treaty, pending the outcome 
of the unclos conciliation.
By March 2018, it was clear 
that the gamble had paid off. The 
 renegotiated agreement saw a 
 substantial increase in Timor-Leste’s 
share of the future Greater Sunrise 
revenues to 70 or 80 percent, pending 
resolution of the final contested issue 
of where the pipeline for downstream 
processing will land—in Australia or 
Timor-Leste (The Conversation 2018). 
The higher revenue figure would 
operate in the event that Timor-Leste 
does not achieve its goal of sending 
the pipeline to the southern coast of 
Timor. While Timor-Leste may not 
have achieved its entire suite of goals, 
the creation of a maritime boundary 
with Australia for the first time and 
a major increase in future  revenues 
would be seen as a substantial 
 victory in Dili and an endorsement 
of the legal strategy of prosecut-
ing the  dispute through the unclos 
 compulsory  conciliation process. 
michael leach
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